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UNRAVELING THE RIDDLE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE
. YoungbloodHenderson *
Introduction
Something very important is wrong with a judicial acceptance of
the modern paradigm' of "Indian title of Occupancy" as a passive
title rather than a proprietary title under the land tenure system of
the United States. This article is an attempt to isolate the error in-
herent in the modern paradigm and to analyze its relationship to
the doctrinal foundations formulated in the seminal cases that
grappled with the complex issue of Indian title. In order to under-
stand the modern quandary surrounding "Indian title of Occupan-
cy" and to challenge the validity of the modern paradigm the
Supreme Court has formulated, it will be necessary to first briefly
remind the legal profession of the nature and utility of land tenure
systems; second, to examine the doctrinal origins of Indian title in
the classic decisions of the Marshall Court in the early nineteenth
century; third, to explore the subsequent conceptualization riddle
that plagued "Indian title" following the Marshall Court, creating
the modern paradigm in a shift of judicial thought; and finally, to
conclude with a statement of the resulting modern predicament
concerning tribal tenure and dominion in American law.
While the federal courts have continually restated their commit-
ment to respect Indian title, it is submitted that the court's concept
of Indian title has slowly but perceptibly changed from its original
concept as established in the Marshall Court. The modern
paradigm of Indian title," the result of a sudden shift from the
original precedent, nevertheless appears to be established under
the authority of the classic cases. In actuality, however, the
modern vision of Indian title took shape in the misty propositions
of legal commentators attempting to coalesce the classic doctrine
of Indian title into the structure of federal land law,3 rather than in
any conceptual fidelity to the classic doctrines. The quest for a
unified theory of federal title undermined the actual holdings of
Indian title in the seminal cases before the Supreme Court. It
destroyed the inherent political, economic, and legal justification
for Indian title and deprived the Indian tribes of their economic
wealth and their dreams for a better future. Simplicity of explana-
tion dominated conceptual fidelity.
'Assistant Professor, Native American Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
Guidance provided by Ababinilli and Ma'heo'o, although the author assumes full respon-
sibility for any errors or ambiguities of interpretation.
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The modern paradigm of Indian title within the field of federal
Indian law is, therefore, not only substantially different in its
premises from the understanding of the Marshall Court, but also
contains a latent potential for ruin of tribal self-determination and
economic development. The severity of this fact situation
demands reappraisal. Such reappraisal requires some criteria
against which the present paradigm can be measured, a standard
by which to understand its validity as a legal paradigm.
The classic cases of the Marshall Court are a standard.' Because
of the importance of precedent in the development of a land tenure
system within the United States,' these cases stand not just as a
point of departure, but specifically as a source of judicial
dependence for all federal courts. The doctrines inherent in these
decisions were importantly prospective rather than retrospective.
They were conceptual tools to aid the courts in choosing among
various plausible grounds of decision; attempts to anticipate the
future relevance of tribal property to the Indians and the federal
government, and to create security in land ownership under the
Federal Constitution. Hence, the seminal cases are the best criteria
by which to measure the validity and legitimacy of the modern
paradigm of Indian title. Indeed, the extrication of the insights of
the classic cases is a crucial task.
In an initial attempt to correct one of the historical errors
embedded in the doctrine of "Indian title of Occupancy," the term
"tribal title" will be used equally and interchangeably. The
modification of "Indian title" is more than quibbling over seman-
tics. It is an attempt to isolate and remove the recurrent bias in the
American legal system for individual ownership and against tribal
ownership. While the growing concept of corporate ownership of
property remains unquestioned in the judicial mind, the similar
concept of tribal ownership has somehow remained questionable
and subject to much judicial suspicion.
This bias is an unacceptable response in the American legal
system, which has proclaimed consistently its commitment to be-
ing not only general and autonomous but also public and positive.
In a substantive sense, this commitment toward autonomy and
generality is translated into the premise that the paradigms for-
rulated and enforced by the separate entities comprising the legal
system cannot be persuasively analyzed as mere restatements of
any identifiable set of nonlegal beliefs or norms, be they
economic, political, or religious.6 The present connotations of In-
dian title seemingly give rise to private or exclusive individual In-
dian ownership of land, rather than to tribal ownership. The
classic cases, however, referred to territory held under tribal
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ownership. While a transformation from tribal ownership to in-
dividual ownership did occur in the Court during the allotment
period of federal Indian policy,7 the allotment policy has been
repealed by Congress and the emphasis has been on rebuilding the
tribal domain rather than allowing fragmented individual estates
to continue.'
The current policy of Congress values rebuilding the tribal do-
main and self-determination as of the highest priority.9 In light of
this statutory command, the inferences of individual Indian title
inherent in "Indian title of Occupancy" are unwarranted and
create false expectation interests within the tribal domain. Tribal
citizens have extremely limited rights to land within a tribal reser-
vation. For example, an Indian cannot sell his land or interest to
another if it belongs to the tribe.'" Hence, it is not analytically ac-
ceptable to continue to use the term "Indian title" when in legal
theory and effect "tribal title" is the meaning being conveyed.
In contrast to the abstract commitment of the courts to the
tribal title of occupancy, they have so far totally failed to provide
any relevant, concrete, or analytical conceptualization of that
phrase to the tribes or to their legal advocates." Similarly, social
science studies to date have failed to provide a clear reconstruction
of tribal title in the past, or a model for the present or the future.1
2
Instead, the entire test of tribal title has been established in terms
of land acquisition policies, rather than in land tenure concep-
tualization in legal or social theory. The courts have been more
concerned about whether the tribes can lay claim to aboriginal
ownership because of a failure of the federal government to pur-
chase or consensually extinguish title to such land, rather than be-
ing concerned with developing descriptive or analytical principles
to explain why such federal extinguishment is important. The
traditional test of tribal title was absence of proof of extinguish-
ment of tribal title in the statutory manner to the federal govern-
ment; the tribes held titles just as "sacred" as the right of the
federal government to acquire the fee to such land by purchasing it
from the tribes.'3 In spite of the continual restatement of such
eulogisms, another test has been asserted which holds that some
aboriginal title is unrecognized and therefore not a property right
within the meaning of the fifth amendment of the Constitution."
Unrecognized aboriginal title is merely a right of occupancy at the
will of the federal government.' 5 It is this transformation which is
at the heart of the modern paradigm, and the issue this article
seeks to resolve by comparison with the classic paradigm cases of
tribal title.
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I. Land Tenure System in the Legal Theory
of the Modern Liberal State
To understand the significance of the transition of the "sacred"
nature of tribal title to a "naked possession," a review of the basic
intersection between legal history, economics, and the theory of
land tenure is necessary. One of the implicit assumptions of
modern property law in the United States is that all title within its
boundaries is under either federal or state tenurial systems of land.
I[ndian title under this assumption is translated as neither a land
tenure system nor a source of title under the American tenurial
system of property law. Based on the influence of these assump-
tions, the modern paradigm of tribal title has established its major
premise in the law. ' This is a sharp break with the legal history of
property in the United States, as well as the theories of land tenure
systems in the liberal state.
In the history of the development of federal land tenure
systems, the contemporary premise of the unity of federal land
tenure was not a major premise.'7 Rather, it was a realizable goal
inherent in the policies of the federal government, but subject to
the task of developing a doctrine that recognized the tribal title in
more than a trivial fashion while affirming it as a source of federal
title in a manner acceptable to the tribes and the citizenry of the
United States.
The quest toward fairly and justly extinguishing tribal title is the
inherent spirit and unity of the classic cases of federal Indian law.
The resolution of the problem of tribal title which could be con-
veyed to the federal government to create a federal land tenure
system forced the Supreme Court to discover the relationship
between tribal tenure and sovereignty and the European
sovereigns' peripheral claims in North America. In the classic
paradigm, the doctrine was announced that tribal title was the sole
source of title which perfected the European entitlements under
the doctrine of discovery.'8 Extinguishing tribal title, the classic
paradigm held, was a monopoly of the federal government in
terms of the Constitution.' It was a necessary prerequisite to
establishing federal title, which could then be distributed by Con-
gress to the citizens of the United States. It was the ultimate con-
cern of the new constitutional government in the nineteenth cen-
tury. It was measured in terms of probability rather than in-
evitability.
The modern paradigm stands in stark contrast to the classic
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paradigm. Tribal title in the modern paradigm has been stripped
of an inference of being a potential or historical source of title."
Yet, at the same time, the paradigm of law also holds that the right
of tribal occupancy must be released or otherwise extinguished if
federal title is to be clear of any encumbrances. 2 ' These conflicting
positions of the modern paradigm are the manifestation of a
perplexing but inevitable paradox of tribal tenure in the land
tenure system of the United States. The persistent inability of the
legal system to resolve this paradox of tribal title demands a
reconsideration of the theory of land tenure in the modern liberal
state and of its incoherence in relation to aboriginal tribal tenures.
The existence of the paradox has been obstructed by the
relationship between the modern property paradigm's view of
itself, as expressed in the premises of the paradigm, and the
historical truth of the establishing of the federal land tenure
system. Professor Powell noted the source of this obstruction in
his treatise, The Law of Real Property. He stated that when many
judges consider the present applicable rules of real property, there
sometimes exists an ill-concealed contempt for "history," which he
considers unsound." Powell commented on this insight by stating:
Social institutions are as much a product of the past as
geologic formations or the human mechanism. It is not possi-
ble to acquire a fully intelligible picture of the present
without some considerable attention to how things come to
be as they are. Such knowledge is necessary even for the per-
son most dissatisfied with what he finds in the existent law.
Sound reform requires an understanding of the reasons and
processes which brought into being that which is to be
reformed.Y
This antihistorical trend complicates the attempt to define
and resolve the paradox of the aboriginal tribal territory's
relationship to the sources of the federal tenurial system. The
elucidation of the link between aboriginal tribal territory and
the legal theory of land tenure and title in the modern liberal
state becomes central to unraveling the paradox. Such
elucidation is both conceptual and historical.
In theory, the land tenure systems developed by the territorial
sovereign are based on the insight that in its essence, a land tenure
system refers to the relationship among men and things in the
world. There are two complementary ways to approach this issue.
The first treats land tenure, or the conceptual system of property,
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as a problem of the evolution of social consciousness;" the second,
as a manifestation of a legitimate legal sovereignty.25 Viewed
separately, the two explanations are inadequate and misleading.
Taken together, they compensate for each other's deficiencies, and
forge a theory of a land tenure system which is both the
psychological and legal foundation for all estates or interests in
scarce resources within a defined boundary of a political society."
A conceptual system of distribution of property within any
society is an abstract and instrumental idea (or instinct), or alter-
natively, an elaborate social institution common to all societies.
But it is not actuality. A land tenure system is conceptual and does
not exist in the same sense that people exist in reality, but rather
refers to the invisible social and cultural bonds that exist in the
spaces between humans and material objects and which regulate
their interrelationships. From this standpoint, a land tenure
system is a conceptual way of "seeing" particular relationships
among men in society, which are devised, developed, and prac-
ticed in social-economic life, but nevertheless exist as independent
phenomena which are being structured.
All land tenure originates in some folk or cultural norms for
regulating the holding of land between individuals in any given
society." At a subsequent date these folk concepts are conceptual-
ly solemnized and formalized in law by either the legitimate legal
sovereign or the common law process of the courts."' Ownership
theory springs from this formalized process, but remains relative
to the folk notions. Its precise meaning is different in every
culture, varying according to custom, tradition, and the relative
social status of those who enjoy its privileges."0 A prime example
of this relative notion is the "estate" concept of Anglo-American
land tenure systems. While the estate notion seems conceptually
natural to the English and American legal professions, it must be
pointed out that the notion is not replicated in any other land
tenure system in the world.2°
Because of the relativity of the concept of land tenure, the struc-
turing of the distribution of property within any society has been
intimately linked to the exercise of legitimate political power and,
to a lesser extent, to economic reality. "Property and law are born
together and die together," commented Jeremy Bentham on the
relationship between man and property in civil society. "Before
laws were made there was not property; take away the law and
property ceases. ""' This is not a theory of the origins of property,
but rather a statement that property exists merely in the con-
templation of legal theory. This relation is particularly true in the
modern liberal state.
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Law in the modern liberal state is the creation of an autonomous
and general legal system composed of private parties, a legitimate
legal sovereignty and its administrative agencies, and the indepen-
dent judiciary. The legitimate legal sovereignty exists solely for
the purpose of preventing the conflicts of the private parties from
taking a disasterous tailspin into civil war. 2 Because property is a
fundamental expectation of social man but also a scarce resource
in most societies, the territorial sovereign must create certain legal
forms to distribute the scarce resources among the members of its
society.
The source of authority of the territorial sovereign resides in the
social compact: men band together and create a liberal state by
their own volitional allegiance in order to create a certain amount
of stability in society." The social compact concept also justifies
the coercion of individuals by the state to overcome the competi-
tion for scarce goods, which is seen as a fundamental fact of social
life and a product of either the inherent insatiability of human
desires" or the perverse structure of social life?' To accomplish this
social objective, the liberal state achieves its end by imposing a
compromise on all citizens, in their struggle to maximize their
share of the scarce satisfactions, by intervention into the market
transactions to stabilize it.
The intervention of the state in relation to property is the
establishment of a land tenure system. The government, as a
legitimate legal sovereignty, creates legal rights among the citizens
within its boundaries by establishing a land tenure system sup-
posedly based on the social expectations of the citizenry, and is an
acceptable compromise between disorder and stability within the
society.36 A land tenure system of real property, then, becomes
both the manifestation of a legal system based on folk notions of
the society and the cause for the creation of that particular legal
system. In either event, an interest in property remains conceptual
in its essence but concrete in application.
Tenurial systems of land, then, function by translating those
cultural assumptions in society into the systematized prediction
that is called law. All estates in land within the boundaries of a ter-
ritorial sovereign reflect a socially acceptable and recognized
distributional compromise and preference scheme in the modern
liberal state. As a result, a dualism is created: not only are the
rights in land the specific manifestation of the relations between
the will of the citizenry, a democratic legislature, and an indepen-
dent judiciary, but also the rights in the land are subject to
distribution and adjustment by the legitimate institutions of
government, and enforceable as long as the governmental action is
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in conformity with the delegations of power granted in the Con-
stitution, within the boundaries of the constitutional territory,
and within the public interest.
A legal sovereign can transfer land to private parties or to cor-
porations, therefore, only to the extent that the land is within its
territorial boundaries, that is, within the limit of its authority and
its land tenure system. Such transfers, however, are always condi-
tional. The conditions of the transfer are relational to the purposes
of civil government. The territorial sovereign always reserves
some specific conditions: the right to tax, the right to condemn,
the right to exercise police power. Other conditions are implied:
the right to control land use and distribution through its spending
power, and the right of escheat.
The key to a land tenure system is a legitimate legal sovereign,
representing the citizenry, and a judiciary system, which is in
charge of applying the will of the citizenry or the sovereign. When
the United States of America came into political existence, it had
neither a legitimate legal sovereign nor a defined citizenry nor any
ownership of land. The creation of an artificial legal sovereign (the
Constitution), based on the volitional consent of the states and
their citizenry, created a citizenry under the Constitution." The
problem of owning land and establishing a land tenure system was
unresolved, but nevertheless allocated to the federal government."
To acquire land, the federal government had to negotiate with
the aboriginal sovereigns of America-the Indian tribes. This
quickly became the most complex and important issue of the nine-
teenth century: How should a democratic nation extinguish tribal
title under the authority of sovereign tribes of Indians? To
establish relations between tribes and their property, the Supreme
Court struggled in the world of conceptual thought, which the or-
dinary citizen was hardly conscious of, and which, moreover, the
modern paradigm of tribal title fails to understand because the
land tenure system it takes for granted now was itself invisible to
the legal profession at the beginning of the nineteenth century and
its operations abstruse. It was a mere cobweb of invisible
filaments the Court would call "Indian title of Occupancy," which
forged a conceptual relationship among the interrelations of two
sovereign nations primarily in the western legal mind.
II. The Classic Paradigm of Tribal Dominion and Title
The question of tribal title was and still remains an issue of
political and legal theory. It was a threshold question that ac-
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companied the discovery of the New World by the European and
Iberian kingdoms. While it is possible to describe the debate on the
conceptual level as a collision between opposing "world views," it
is best to illustrate that the fact situation of the New World con-
fronted the intricate framework of the Aristotelian paradigm, and
created in the process the fundamental ideology of the modern
liberal state. The pivot of the controversy in relation to property
theory was how could the non-Indian kingdoms acquire "title" in
the New World. It was a question that not only created theory; it
modified theory as answers were proposed and as the questions
were discussed.
Believing that all men were created in the image of God, and
that they were naturally social beings, it is hardly surprising that
theoreticians made considerable efforts to integrate the Indians
and their property into the framework of Christianized
Aristotelianism and a divinely instituted ontological hierarchy.'0
With the growing separation of church and state, however, this
Christian version merely became theoretical insights established
by the Church. The seventeenth-century social contract theorists,
rejecting the Church, created an alternative to the Aristotelian
paradigm in terms of property acquisition, which was built on the
anomalous evidence of the Indians in the New World." The
various responses to the nature of tribal title were often the
speculative biases of interested parties, instead of concrete
methods of tracing the complex scheme of titles, claims,
privileges, and obligations, but they formed a constellation of
theories that the newly instituted Supreme Court of the United
States of America could select to make the law of the land. It was a
period of formation of a national doctrine of land tenure in ac-
cordance with the tenets of human freedom and potentiality. It is
necessary, then, to elucidate the resulting paradigm of tribal title
which emerged from the Marshall Court.
Fletcher v. Peck
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of tribal title in
1810 in the case of Fletcher v. Peck.4' In order to resolve the con-
flict concerning the status of tribal title, and possession and al-
leged ownership of the land by both the federal and state govern-
ments, the Court established a divergent theoretical framework
which would haunt subsequent courts in their attempts to under-
stand the nature of tribal title. The key issue presented in the case,
in relationship to tribal title, was whether the disputed territory
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was within the boundaries of either the United States or the state
of Georgia, even though it was in the actual possession of the In-
dian tribes concerned.
The majority decision of the Court, authored by Chief Justice
Marshall, held that the land was within the boundaries of the state
of Georgia. As far as tribal title and possession were concerned, he
avoided the issue by holding that such was to be respected by all
courts until legitimately extinguished. Until such time as tribal title
might be legitimately extinguished, it was not absolutely repug-
nant to seisin in fee on the part of Georgia. He stated for the ma-
jority:
It was doubted, whether the state can be seised in fee of
lands, subject to Indian title, and whether such a decision
that they were seised in fee might not be construed to amount
to a decision that their grantee might maintain an ejectment
for them, notwithstanding that title. The majority of the
court is of the opinion, that the nature of Indian title, which
is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimate-
ly extinguished is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to
seisin in fee on the part of the state. 3
A different conclusion of law, however, was arrived at by
Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion. Justice Johnson, in contrast
to Marshall, determined that the Indian nations held the land as
fee simple absolute proprietors; the interest of the state of Georgia
was a preemptive interest which had already been ceded to the
federal government. The Indian nations had a higher title, ac-
cording to Justice Johnson, than either the state or the federal
government."
Both of these decisions are more important for the arguments
they reject than for the arguments they explain. Arguing for the
land companies and Mr. Peck, both Joseph Story and John Quin-
cy Adams strongly asserted the theoretical proposition that while
the Indian tribes were independent nations, they "had no idea of
property in the soil." These powerful attorneys in the develop-
ment of American law admitted the political sovereignty of the
tribes, but proposed to the Court that in terms of property
rights-if any-the Indians had a "mere occupancy for the pur-
pose of hunting." 5 They also argued that such occupancy "was not
like our tenures," but rather "a right regulated by treaties, not by
deeds of conveyances," and that treaties were the "effects of
conquest.""
In response to these arguments, both the majority and dissen-
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ting opinions rejected the land companies' theories concerning the
nature of tribal title. Both opinions clearly held that tribal title ex-
isted as a recognizable and protectable property right, but
divergent explanations were offered as to the source of the proper-
ty right. The crucial difference between these divergent explana-
tions in the two opinions can be resolved by land tenure theory.
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority of the Court, at-
tempted to establish tribal title as a system of tenurial rights
distinct from the Anglo-American tenurial system.' On the other
side, Justice Johnson attempted to create a unitarian doctrine of
federal title, under which the Indian tribes had a "fee-simple ab-
solute title" under a federal tenurial system of land. 8
The majority of the Court failed to elaborate on the precise
nature of tribal title. The Court avoided the issue by holding that
it was a distinct form of property rights which "is not such as to be
absolutely repugnant to a seisin in fee on the part of the state." 9
This explanation was insufficient to Justice Johnson. He disagreed
that tribal title was not absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee of
Georgia. The Court was asked whether the state of Georgia was
legally seised in fee of the soil, subject only to the extinguishment
of part of the Indian title. "[O]f an estate in fee simple in the lands
in question, subject to another estate [in the Indian tribes],"
Johnson noted, "we know not what nor whether it may not
swallow up the whole estate decided to exist in Georgia. ... 5o The
question is," stated Johnson, as he came to the ultimate conflict in
the case, "whether it can be correctly predicated of the interest or
estate which the State of Georgia had in these lands 'that the state
was seized, thereof, in fee simple."'5'
Noting but not commenting on the relationship between proper-
ty rights and political sovereignty, Johnson's answer to the ques-
tion was partially dependent upon the political status of the In-
dians involved in the fact situation. In the present case, the Court
was dealing with Indian nations, which, Johnson concluded, had
"limited sovereignty and the absolute proprietorship of their
soil." Even though pronounced a limited sovereignty, the treaties
acknowledged the Indian nations as an independent people. While
it was noted by Justice Johnson that the national government can
both "legislate upon the conduct of strangers or citizens within
their limits" and restrain "all strangers from encroaching upon
their territory," this legislation (he held) does not limit their
independence.53 This congressional legislation limits not the tribes
or nations, but rather citizens and subjects of the United States.
Hence, despite the label of "limited sovereignty," Justice Johnson
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believed the nations and tribes indeed to be separate nations as il-
lustrated by the treaties signed with them by the federal govern-
ment.
"Can, then, one nation be said to be seized in lands, the rights of
soil of which is in another nation?" asked Justice Johnson." "All
the restriction upon the right of soil in the Indian amounts only to
an exclusion of all competitors from their market," he answered,
and concluded that "the limitation upon their sovereignty
amounts to the rights [if agreed upon in the treaties with the na-
tional government] to governing every person within their [ter-
ritorial] limits except themselves [as a foreign nation in America].
The tribal interest in the land was characterized as "absolute pro-
prietors" and "possessory" by Justice Johnson, while the interest of
the state of Georgia was a "mere possibility" or "preemption" and
the ceded interest to the federal government was considered as a
future interest upon extinguishment of the absolute tribal title."
The method of extinguishment of tribal title by the national
government was fully established: "the uniform practice of
acknowledging their rights of soil, but purchases from them.""7
Returning to the ultimate conflict in the case, Justice Johnson
pointed out that "if the interest of Georgia was nothing more than
a pre-emptive right, how could that [right] be called a fee
simple?""9 A fee simple estate under the federal and state land
tenure systems had no restrictions, but rather might last forever. It
is the absolute ownership insofar as an individual has an interest
in the land under the American tenurial system.59 It is not qualified
or subject to any contingency to vest absolute ownership.- A
preemptive ownership in American tenurial law stood in contrast
to a fee simple estate.' It was merely a right of first acceptance or
refusal if the owner of a fee simple land places it on the market. It
is contingent upon the motivation and desires of the fee simple
owners. "How could [a preemptive right] be called a fee-simple,"
pleaded a dismayed Justice Johnson, "when the interest in the
State of Georgia [under Anglo-American law] was nothing more
than a power to acquire a fee-simple by purchase, when the
[tribal] proprietory should be pleased to sell?" A fee simple estate
may be held in reversion, Johnson noted, "but our law will not ad-
mit the idea of its being limited after a fee-simple." '
It was conceptually impossible for Georgia to have a fee simple
interest in the land under Anglo-American law. This was the
thrust of Johnson's analytical opinion. With clear and exceptional
logic, Justice Johnson established that if the land were under the
possession and control of a sovereign Indian nation or tribe under
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the Anglo-American land tenure system, 4 that interest was fee
simple in nature. Unfortunately, Johnson had misperceived the
arguments of Chief Justice Marshall in the majority opinion, but
had nevertheless cast the riddle of tribal title which would con-
tinue to haunt later courts. The majority opinion had not attemp-
ted to incorporate tribal title into the land tenure system of the
federal or state governments. On the contrary, it had suggested
that the tribal tenurial system was compatible with other
American tenurial systems until the tribal title was extinguished,
presumably by statutory purchase." Until such time, however, the
courts were bound to respect tribal title as an equally valid and
legitimate title to either federal or state systems.
This difference between Justice Johnson's opinion and that of
the majority opinion turned on whether tribal title was viewed as
within or equal but separate to the American tenurial system of
land. Both the logic and the reasons given in Johnson's opinion
would be extremely valid if tribal title was placed totally under
federal land tenure, i.e., the tribal title would be a fee simple
title. But the majority decision strongly implied that the legal
recognition of tribal title was neither dependent upon nor within
the land tenure of the United States. The tribes were independent
nations with a distinct land tenure system which was to continue
separate from American land tenure systems until extinguished.
Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh
The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Fletcher v. Peck in
1823 in the case of Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. MIntosh.17 It
clearly established that tribal title was a distinct pattern of land
tenure right not derived from the common law, but merely
recognized and respected as a tenure system by federal law until
purchased by the federal government. In this unanimous opinion
the Court elaborated at length on the source of the exclusive en-
titlement vested in the federal government to extinguish tribal ti-
tle, clarified the compatible nature of tribal title with federal title,
and further explained the effect of a treaty conveyance on the
holders under tribal title, both tribal and non-Indian.
The central issues presented in M'ntosh are difficult to isolate
because of the tumbling logic of the opinion. It did, however,
resume the translegal conflict of land of Fletcher in relation to a
conflict between non-Indian purchasers of tribal title and holders
of a federal patent. This fact situation, unfortunately, was not
conducive to a clarification of the effects of a translegal issue, but
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it did provide a forum for the Court to establish its entitlement
theory under discovery." Still, the contextual configuration was
only indirectly concerned with tribal title because it centered its
substantive discussions on the rights of non-Indian purchasers
under tribal title.69 The fact configuration necessarily limits the
holding of the case in terms of the rights of tribal members to land
under tribal title because neither of the parties were tribal
members, nor did they directly represent any recognizable tribal
interest that was distinct from advocacy of their position.
The involved parties in the fact situation were third party
lessees of non-Indians who claimed divergent sources of owner-
ship. On the one side were the lessees of the purchaser claiming ti-
tle directly from the Indian tribe, and on the other side was a
holder of a federal patent which derived from a treaty conveyance
from the same tribes to the federal government but at a subsequent
date. 0 Thus, the holding of the case did not concern aboriginal ti-
tle, but rather the validity of a federal patent issued under an
unrestricted treaty conveyance against an antecedent purchase by
individuals directly from tribes. The central issue was transferable
interests that derived from tribal title. Specifically, it was the
validity of an antecedent grant of land by the tribes to English sub-
jects and a later tribal conveyance by an unrestricted treaty of the
same land to the federal government.
On this issue the Court held that the title exhibited by the non-
Indian purchasers of Indian title was not sufficient to be sustained
in a federal court." The exact reason was not clearly stated on why
the title would not be sustained, but the reasoning appeared to
surround the subsequent unrestricted treaty conveyance of the
land to the federal government. There were, however, other issues
the Court had to address in the process of writing the opinion.
The first issue was whether tribal title could be recognized in the
courts of the United States. Another logically related issue was
whether the tribes had the power to give, and private individuals
to receive, a title that could be sustained in the courts of this
country. 2 The Court affirmed both these issues.
In attempting to deal with the validity of tribal title and the
issue of whether it could be given to an individual, the Court
resorted to the land tenure theory. This strategem is obvious
where the Court applied a mixed form of law to resolve these
issues. 7 The first form of law was the principles of abstract justice
which regulate the rights of civilized nations; the second form was
those principles "which our own government has adopted in the
particular case and given us as the rule of decision."": The resort to
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both international and domestic law reflects and argues for the
proposition that legal recognition of tribal title was under a tribal
tenurial system and did not depend on its conformity to federal
tenure systems." This proposition also reflected the Court's con-
cept of the land tenure theory, Le., "the right of society to
prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and
preserved" is "a function of the law of the nations in which they
lie" in "the rights of civilized nations."'7 This position probably
was taken by the Court in order to distinguish this decision from
the unity of federal title theory raised in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck.
In the absence of a jurisdictional statement, and in light of the
Court's failure to elaborate on the reasons why it refused to sus-
tain the plaintiff's estate, which was purchased from the tribes, it
is interesting to note that the Court explicitly recognized that "title
to lands" was dependent entirely on the law of the nation in which
the land was situated. Also, it is interesting that the Court
acknowledged the "authority" of the tribal chiefs to grant title to
private individuals under tribal law, Le., "[als far as it could be
given by their own people."7 The only theory, then, which could
invalidate the private individual's title was a subsequent
unrestricted treaty between the tribe and the United States. In
short, the treaty conveyance was an exercise of eminent domain
by the tribe and abolished all rights held under tribal law which
were not reserved in the treaty.78
The Court also acknowledged that the particular tribes were in
"rightful possession" of the land they conveyed to the individuals.
With the holding that the tribes had actual possession to the land
in question, and that it had the authority to grant an estate under
the tribal tenurial system to both private individuals and to
governments, the Court clearly and without qualification
established and recognized a tribal tenurial system that was
distinct from federal and state tenurial systems. It also recognized
tribal law as regulating the estates under that tribal tenurial
system.
In sum, on the issue present for resolution in M'Intosh, tribal
land tenure was held to exist as a legitimate land tenure system;
the land tenure system was recognized by federal law and remain-
ed separate but compatible with other land tenure systems under
federal law until extinguished. The only remaining issue was to ex-
plain the federal authority for entering an unrestricted treaty that
could abolish the individual titles under the tribal land tenure
system.
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In contrast to the quick resolution of the arguments on tribal
land tenure, the Court spent an extravagant amount of time in
establishing the principle that the ultimate title to land within the
United States was held by the federal government as the successor-
in-interest to the discovery by England.7 This response was un-
doubtedly an attempt to modify the position the majority opinion
had taken in Fletcher v. Peck, to the effect that the state did own
the tribal land, rather than the federal government. This conclu-
sion was undiscussed in the opinion, however.'
In MIntosh, the Court established the principle that discovery
created an entitlement in the discovered nations to extinguish
tribal title. Discovery did not convey or vest a perfect title, as too
often is alleged, but rather it merely was evidence of an entitle-
ment to extinguish tribal title.81 In fact, the Court treated discovery
as more an evidentiary principle in international law than a
substantive principle of international law. It was clearly aware
that discovery did not vest property rights in the discovering na-
tion, but rather had a terminological problem of describing the in-
terest the discovering nation possessed.82 Justice Johnson in
Fletcher labeled it a preemptive right in terms of the potential in-
terest of the state, but the Court in M'Intosh merely called it a
"title." ' In legal effect, discovery created a potential interest con-
sensual among the European nations and created a monopoly to
extinguish tribal title and possession." This title is an "inchoate ti-
tle," or rather an "evanescent entitlement" to extinguish tribal ti-
tle. Inherent in the conceptualization of discovery was a theory
which validated tribal property.
The relationship between land tenure theory and the notion of
discovery resided in the derivation of discovery as a principle. It
was consensual among all the European nations. That is to say, it
was a principle all European nations or kingdoms "acknowledged
as the law by which the right of acquisition [of land in the New
World] should be regulated as between themselves."' As a Euro-
pean principle it could limit competition among those nations for
land, but it could not perfect their titles without extinguishing
tribal title.
Discovery, then, was a distributional preference by which the
Europeans agreed to divide up entitlements to acquire tribal
lands.' It was based on the time of the first discovery of the new
continent. It was, in essence, a labor theory of distributional
preferences creating a consensual entitlement. All property laws
within a land tenure system reflect such distributional preferences
in society, and in this regard discovery is no different.
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Discovery gave a "title," Chief Justice Marshall wrote in
M'Intosh, "to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession. "" Again, it
should be stressed that "title" is used as a perfectable entitlement
rather than an already perfect title. It was a distributional
preference the European nations consensually agreed upon as they
rejected the previous papal distributional preference to the ter-
ritory of the New World based on the propagation of Christianity
to the natives.
The principle of discovery did not negate tribal title; on the con-
trary, it recognized and validated tribal title. "In the establishment
of these relations," native inhabitants were admitted by the Court
"to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a
just claim to retaining possession of it.""u More important, the
Court held that the tribes had a right to "regulate" the relations
with the holder of the entitlement under the principle of
discovery."
Under the principle of discovery, the tribes had a right to
possess the land and to prescribe the rules by which tribal land
could be acquired or preserved. The limitation of discovery on
tribal title lay in the free marketability of the land to whomever
the tribes might determine had offered the best price. This limita-
tion was not a limitation of tribal title because the tribe could
withhold its land from the holder of an entitlement to purchase,
but rather a limitation inherent in the consensual agreement of the
other European nations not to intervene. The limitation was based
on an external, consensual agreement, and was not a limitation on
the internal nature of tribal title. Yet, from the European perspec-
tive, it seemingly limited the sovereignty of the tribe. The tribal
"rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations," the
Court stated, "were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased
was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery
gave exclusive title to those who made it."'
The statement that discovery limited tribal sovereignty more
than it did the European sovereigns who consented to the creation
of the principle limiting their potential acquisition of tribal title in
America is a problematic conclusion. The conclusion breaks down
to a question of whether the right to reserve or to dispose of pro-
perty is more inherently an attribute of sovereignty than the rights
which constrict the potential acquisition of property. At any rate,
the question is strictly a historical dilemma of feudal thought
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because in modern political theory "sovereignty" has been
transformed into the consent of the governed rather than with any
dependent incidents of land tenure. One should also be reminded
that the phrase "exclusive title" is merely descriptive of a consen-
sual entitlement to acquire tribal title without interference from
other European nations.
The Court examined two ways of perfecting the entitlement
granted by discovery: conquest and purchase.9' In the context of
the fact situation, the Court validated purchase theory rather than
any conquest theory. The holding of the Court decision was that
purchase from an Indian tribe created an estate under the tribal
tenure system, which estate could be abolished in a treaty con-
veyance between the tribe and the federal government unless
reserved in the treaty. This relationship between conquest and
purchase was best summed up later by Felix Cohen in "Original
Indian Title", in which he stated: "Notwithstanding the prevailing
mythology, the historical fact is that practically all of the real
estate acquired by the United States since 1776 was purchased not
from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from its original
Indian owners."92
Much of the confusion of the mythology of conquest as a man-
ner of perfecting the governmental entitlement was created in later
cases which cite M'Intosh for a conquest theory the case did not in
fact establish. This confusion revolves around the statement of
Marshall that the entitlements of Great Britain were held "by the
sword,"'93 as well as around a later statement that the American
courts cannot question the validity of that title or sustain one that
is incompatible with it.' This confusion is unnecessary, because
the conquests to which the Court refers were not directed against
the Indian tribes of America, but rather against other European
nations attempting to encroach upon the distributional
preferences of Great Britain under the discovery principle. These
transgressions, however, were resolved by warfare in Europe, for
the most part, or in European treaty conferences."
The M'Intosh decision did not validate the European concept of
conquest." It merely noted the potentiality of the conquest theory
in law.
However extravagant the pretension of converting the
discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear;
if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the property of the great mass of the community
originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
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questioned .... However this restriction may be opposed to
natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it
be indispensable to that system under which the country has
been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the
two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and
certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice. '
Fortunately for the Indian tribes, the Court refused to establish
such a theory, but rather referred to the "new and different rule"
of Fletcher v. Peck, which was better adapted to the actual condi-
tion, where the Court rejected similar arguments."8 The Court
summed up Fletcher by stating:
This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has
been supposed to be recognised by all European govern-
ments, from the first settlement of America. The absolute
ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery,
subject only to the Indian title of occupancey, which title the
discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring. Such a
right is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee, than a lease
for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment.'
That Indian tribes may grant their land to anyone is without
question, but the purchasers acquire a right only under tribal land
tenure-not under American land tenure. The purchasers of land
under tribal tenurial principles are immune to neither the exercise
of the powers of sovereignty by the tribe nor to shifts in tribal land
law. In response to the argument that only the British Crown
could convey title to land in America, the Court stated:
If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own
benefit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he could
acquire only that title. Admitting their power to change their
laws or usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate a
portion of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in
severalty, still it is a part of their territory, and is held under
them by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its
efficacy from their will; and, if they choose to resume it, and
make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of the
United States cannot interpose for the protection of the
title. '0
Under the Court's conceptualization of tribal title, it is separate
from the federal title. The tribe may determine the different estates
under tribal tenure as the estates are derivative of the tribal will.
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"The person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their
territory," the Court continued,
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the proper-
ty purchased; holds their title under their protection, and
subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no
tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding. We
can perceive no legal principle which will authorize a Court
to say, the different consequences are attached to this pur-
chase, because it was made by a stranger. By the treaties con-
cluded between the United States and the Indian nations,
whose title the plaintiffs claim, the country comprehending
the lands in controversy has been ceded to the United States,
without any reservation of their title .... Their cession of the
country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair
presumption, that they considered it as of no validity."'
Under the Court's holding, then, the tribes "had an unques-
tionable right to annul any grant they had made to American
citizens,"'' 2 because the tribe as a sovereign government chooses to
convey all the lands by treaty to the United States, without reser-
vation of certain estates under the tribal tenurial system. This
theory is consistent with the modern police powers of the state, as
well as with the eminent domain theory.
The Court's statement is well established authority for the con-
cept of tribal title as well as for a tribal tenurial system. Moreover,
the statements are supported by the political theories of the
English philosophers James Harrington and John Locke. Both of
these political philosophers were among the most popular authors
of the revolutionary era, and influenced the powerful revolu-
tionary leaders.'03
James Harrington, in his book Oceana, developed an analysis
of the relationship between economics and political power.
Political power, he suggested, was determined by the distribution
of land in a society. Given a certain distribution of property, Har-
rington held, a certain normative government tended to emerge. If
most of the property was held by a king, an absolute monarchy
would emerge; if nobility controlled, then either an aristocracy or
a mixed monarchy would emerge; and if people owned most of the
land, a popular form of government would emerge. The historical
distribution of property determined the governmental form of
society, then, in Harrington' estimation; the political society was a
mere reflection of socio-economic conditions."'
John Locke agreed with Harrington on the relationship between
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property and political forms, but he differed concerning how a
legitimate government was created in civil society. Property,
Locke admitted, tends to give power, but he denied that property
gives political authority. Consent, not property, was the founda-
tion of legitimate political authority; yet Locke admitted that the
chief end of government was the preservation of property. 3
Political society secures and guarantees to the individuals their
property and other goods by overcoming the three deficiencies of
the state of nature: the lack of peace, safety, and the public good
of the people.
°6
Property, Locke offered, was a form by which the consensus
that establishes society continued to be operationally
manifested. 0 7 If one dislikes the form of civil society, he is free to
leave it, but if one continues to hold property in society, he is
assumed to continue to accept society. This operational consensus
also gave political sovereigns the right to redistribute the estates
and interests of individuals in society for the public good, as well
as the right to regulate property by taxation."'
These theories of Harrington and Locke are fundamental to any
explanation of tribal tenurial systems. If a person purchases tribal
title and lives under tribal law and regulation, he "operationally
consents" to the will of the tribe. Or in the words of the Court in
M'Intosh, "It]he person who purchases lands from the Indian
tribes, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so
far as respects the property purchased.""'
Justice Smith Thompson (Circuit Court, New York), in the case
of Jackson v. Porter, restated the holding in M'Intosh in 1825,
stating that:
A purchaser, from the natives, at all events, could acquire
only the Indian title, and must hold under them and ac-
cording to their laws. The grant must derive its efficacy from
their will, and if they choose to resume it and make a dif-
ferent disposition of it, courts cannot protect the right before
granted. The purchaser incorporates himself with the In-
dians, and the purchase is to be considered in the same light
as if the grant had been made to an Indian; and might be
resumed by the tribe, and granted over again at their
pleasure. "'
Other seminal cases in the classic paradigm all support the princi-
ple of the distinct but compatible tribal tenurial system announced
in M'Intosh, rather than the modern paradigm.
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Finally, it should be apparent that the Court recognized tribal
tenure systems predicated on tribal sovereignty. It refused to sus-
tain the purchaser's title, primarily on the grounds of the
unrestricted treaty conveyance. The mere fact that the Court
refused to sustain the non-Indian purchaser's interest did not affect
the legality of the tribal tenurial system, tribal sovereignty, nor
tribal title. All these tribal attributes were clearly sustained in
M'Intosh.
Antecedent Authority of M'Intosh's Tribal Tenure Theory
The unanimous opinion.' of the Court in M'Intosh was not in-
novative, but rather the culmination of decisions coming down
from the middle of the seventeenth century. If we are to retain the
importance of the insights of the Court in M'Intosh with a hope of
understanding the error of later cases, we might do well to begin
where they did: with an interpretation of tribal title as it existed in
the jurisprudential consciousness prior to M'Intosh.
A comprehension of the doctrinal foundation of the Court's
theory of tribal title in M'Intosh must commence with the opinion
of the Attorney General of the United States in 1821."1 This opi-
nion, which reflects governmental policy, was designated Seneca
Lands. The holding of the opinion both supports M'Intosh and
clarifies some of its implications. The Attorney General, speaking
for the federal government on the issue of tribal title, determined:
So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of his land,
its title and possession are sovereign and
exclusive .... Although the Indian title continues only during
their possession, yet that possession has been always held
sacred, and can never be disturbed but by their consent.
They do not hold under the states, nor under the United
States; their title is original, sovereign, and exclusive."'
Under this conceptualization, the tribal land tenurial system is
clearly distinct and separate from the land tenure systems of both
the state and federal governments. It is not held under those land
tenure systems, nor does it emanate from them. The opinion on
this is the governmental counterpart to the judicial holding in
Fletcher v. Peck and M'Intosh.
In the same manner that Fletcher, Seneca Lands, and M'Intosh
establish the doctrinal trinity creating tribal land tenure systems in
American law as separate and distinct from the other systems of
land tenure, there also exists a congruent trinity in the law of the
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British Empire. Central to the British doctrinal trinity is the case of
Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut, which has been called "the
greatest cause ever ... heard at the [Privy] Council Board.""' The
residual components of the British trinity are the opinions
concerning tribal purchase by English subjects for the Crown, and
the legitimization of tribal title in the colony of Massachusetts.
These controlling authorities clearly establish the doctrine of tribal
land tenure consistent with the holding of Mntosh.
The history of the Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut case is long
and tedious,"5 but can be summarized briefly to illustrate its im-
portance. The case began in 1703 when the Mohegan Tribe peti-
tioned the Queen in Council, alleging that the tribe had been
deprived of certain tracts of land which had been reserved to them
by treaty with the royal colony of Connecticut. Their attempts to
resolve the issue with the colony had failed, so the tribe requested
that a Royal Commission adjudicate their land issue. Attorney
General Northely determined that the royal charter of Connec-
ticut did not include tribal land, and therefore the Queen could
lawfully erect a court within the colony with an appeal to the
Queen in Council. "' The first Royal Commission, in an ex parte
hearing, held for the Mohegan Tribe in 1705. In a unanimous
opinion, the Commission restored the land to the tribe and gave
the cost of litigation to the tribe."
7
The colony appealed this judgment to the Queen in Council on
the premise that it had absolute title to the lands through con-
quest, that the tribe was subservient to the colony, and that the
Royal Commission was illegal because a judicial determination of
title to land ought rightfully to be decided by jury and not a com-
mission. The arguments of the colony were rejected by the Privy
Council, and the propriety of the Royal Commission was upheld.
The Committee of the Privy Council held that the status of the
Mohegan Tribe was as a sovereign nation which was not subser-
vient to the colony. It also rejected the theory of conquest as a
source of absolute title for the colony. However, the Committee
did reverse the awarding of the litigation cost to the tribal ad-
vocates, and advised that a new commission of review should
reexamine this issue. 118
The second Royal Commission of 1738 was a total failure. It
acted as a commission of review, but refused to consider either the
judgment of the first Commission or the results of the appeals to
the Committee, while reversing the decisions of these tribunals.
The tribe appealed the acts of the second Commission to the King
in Council because of its irregularities; the Crown agreed with the
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tribe's contentions and established the third and last commission
of review."9
The Court of Commissioners, as the third Royal Commission
called itself, convened in 1743 to rehear the entire issue. It sum-
moned the numerous tenants in possession of the controverted
land to defend their titles against the tribal title, but the tenants
refused to appear before this Commission. The tenants challenged
the jurisdiction of the court to determine individual land titles on
the premise that such a court was contrary to the laws of England,
of Connecticut, and of the royal charter of the colony. This issue
tested the authority of the Crown over individual land titles
within the colony, and was a direct challenge to the King and his
Privy Council. More importantly, for our purposes, it also
presented a regal court with the first opportunity to determine the
legal status of Indian tribes within the British Empire.
The argument advanced by the colonists was that the Indians
were subjects of Great Britain, and as subjects, the Indians' title
must therefore be determined by the laws of either Great Britain or
the colony.'20 The Court of Commissioners rejected this argument.
Commissioner Horfmanden, writing for the majority of the Court
of Commissioners in 1743, held that:
The Indians, though living amongst the king's subjects in
these countries, are a separate and distinct people from them,
they are treated with as such, they have a policy of their
own, they make peace and war with any nation of Indians,
when they think fit, without countroul from the English It is
apparent the crown looks upon them not as subjects, but as a
distinct people, for they are mentioned as such throughout
Queen Anne's and his present majesty's commissions by
which we now sit. And it is as plain, in my conception, that
the crown looks upon the Indians as having, the property of
the soil of these countries; and that their lands are not, by his
majesty's grant of particular limits of them for a colony,
thereby impropriated in his subject till they have made fair
andhonest purchases of the natives .... So that from hence I
draw this consequence, that a matter of property in lands in
dispute between the Indians as a distinct people (for no act
has been shown whereby they became subjects) and the
English subjects, cannot be determined by thelaw of our
land, but by a law equal to both parties, which is the law of
nature and nations; and upon this foundation, as I take it,
these commissions have most properly issued .... And now
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to maintain that the tenants in possession of the land in con-
troversy are not bound to answer the complaint before this
court, is to endeavor to defeat the very end and design of our
commission; for surely it would be a very lame and defective
execution of it, to hear only the matter of complaint between
the tribe of Indians and this government.'2'
Embodied in this decision and its subsequent confirmation were
the ideas of tribal sovereignty, tribal tenure and title, adjudication
of tribal conflicts in the law of nature and nations, and the concept
of fair and honest purchases which dominated the opinion in
M'Intosh. This opinion was confirmed by the Privy Council, the
highest judicial power in the British Empire. '
The second source of authority for the validity of tribal title as a
source of title in the Empire was the opinion of the Privy Council
to the Crown in the seventeenth century.'" The concern of this
opinion was the effects of purchases of land by individual subjects
of Great Britain from Indian tribes without the approval of the
Crown. The conclusion of the Privy Council was that:
In respect to such places as have been, or shall be, acquired
by treaty, or grant, from any of the Indian principles, or
government, your majesty's letters patent are not necessary;
the property of the soil vesting in the grantees, by the Indian
grants subject only to your majesty's right of sovereignty
over the settlements, as English settlements, and over the in-
habitants, as English subjects, who carry with them your ma-
jesty's laws, wherever they form colonies, and receive your
majesty's protection, by virtue of your royal charters.'
The importance of the official opinion of the Privy Council
resides in the fact that it sheds crucial enlightenment to the rela-
tionship between the claims of absolute title and the authority of a
"subject to" qualification of federal title in M'Intosh. "An absolute
title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or
in different government," explains Marshall in one segment of his
arguments; "an absolute title, must be an exclusive title, or at least
a title which excludes all others not compatible with it."'" Great
Britain had an "absolute title," Marshall concluded, which was
"subject only to the Indian right of occupancy and recognized the
absolute right of the Crown to extinguish that right."' ° American
title was also held by the Court to be subject to an Indian right of
occupancy."'
Typically, subsequent courts and commentators have inter-
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preted his "subject to" inference as an inferior title. Yet, when the
origins of the "subject to" arguments of Attorney Pratt and
Solicitor General Yorke for the Privy Council are compared to the
statements in M'Intosh, such interpretation becomes suspicious.
What the Chief Justice was attempting to assert was that the ab-
solute title of both Britain and America was an exclusive entitle-
ment to purchase aboriginal title. But tribal title, being a separate
but compatible system of title from either of the British and
American systems, it did not affect the absoluteness of title held
under either system. Until tribal title was extinguished, the federal
entitlement was subject to the tribal right of sovereignty and land
tenure law. This did not mean that people could not purchase the
land but rather implied that they could purchase subject to a
future conveyance. This is totally consistent with the holding in
M'Intosh that a subsequent treaty conveyance could impair in-
dividual rights established under tribal tenurial systems. The "sub-
ject to" condition of federal title merely confirmed the legal right
of the tribes to sell or not to sell their land until a compromise
could be reached by the federal and tribal governments. Under the
M'Intosh theory, until such consensual agreement, the tribe
regulated its own domain. This is a much different position than
that ordinarily assumed by the courts and commentators.
A third and final example of tribal sovereignty and land tenure
systems in the American colonies under the British Empire oc-
curred in the colony of Massachusetts in the last decade of the
seventeenth century."M As a result of the 1683 declaration of the
Crown, the Lords of Trade attempted to confirm the titles and
quit-rents to the inhabitants of Massachusetts. But the Lords
found it impossible to confirm these titles because of rival and
defective claims. The confirmation of this title would signify the
Crown's approval of their absolute title, as well as bring uniformi-
ty into the Massachusetts land tenure system. Prior to this con-
firmation process, the Massachusetts government, probably fear-
ing land tenure problems with the Crown,' 9 had sent its commis-
sioners into regions where "squatters" had settled on land without
any title and forced them to recognize the rights of the tribal
tenurial system by payment of quitrents to the tribes.""
Under the regal confirmation process, the Lords of Trade were
instructed by the Massachusetts commissioners to confirm all title
held under tribal deeds. This validated tribal deeds as a source of
title, subject to regal sovereignty. Commissioner Andros reported
that the Puritan theocrats considered that it was far more impor-
tant to hold the land under a tribal deed by "fair contract or just
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conquest" than under English law."' This theory is confirmed in
the writings of John Cotton. Speaking for the Puritan position of
tribal title, Cotton stated in 1647:
[Tihat it was neither the King's intendement, nor the English
Planters to take possession of the Country by murther of the
Natives, or by robbery: but either to take possession of the
voyd places of the Country by the Law of Nature, (for Vac-
cuum Domicilium credit occupanti:) or if we tooke any
Lands from the Natives, it was by way of purchase and free
consent.'3
Cotton's concept of the Puritans' position is consistent with the
M'Intosh concept, and with the other authority mentioned in this
section. Its explanation also rejects the theory that all land in
America was considered vacant land, as is commonly attributed
to John Winthrop.'33 In fact, Winthrop claimed his land by pur-
chase from an Indian tribe under a deed.'34 Another Puritan, John
White, advocated the Biblical arguments but still asserted that
"[tihe land affords ground enough to receive more people," and
"the Natives invite us to set downe by them, and offer us what
grounds wee will: so that eyther want of possession by others, or
the possessors gift, and sale, may assure our right: we neede not
feare a clear title to the soyle."' '3 Thus, the Puritan position was
more correctly a purchase theory than a theory of vacant land or a
Biblical labor theory, which is often proposed by courts and
commentators."6
These examples clearly illustrate that the tribes were considered
as sovereign nations with the rights to their territories. The com-
bination of political sovereignty and the proprietary powers
establish a theory of dominion. The regulation of land under the
distributional preferences of a sovereign with proprietary powers
establishes the essence of a theory of land tenure. As a result, it
could clearly be supported, in the laws of nations and nature of
both the British Empire and America, that the Indian tribes not
only had tribal dominion, but also had a recognized and separate
land tenure system.
The British trinity also reveals that individuals could purchase
from the Indian tribes. This tribal title was valid under the British
law, until the British government extinguished tribal lands and
perfected its title. This is consistent with the holding in M'Intosh,
but this established a quandary as to whether the title of the col-
onies was held under English tenure or tribal tenure until tribal ti-
tle was extinguished. The Court in M'Intosh avoided discussing
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these problems on fact distinctions. The Court arguments in this
.regard were not particularly convincing.'
The Cherokee Cases
In the now famous Cherokee Cases, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court affirmed
the theory of tribal title in M'Intosh. Tribal title was seen as a
distinct pattern of rights derived solely from tribal authority, and
not dependent upon either the state or federal land tenure systems.
Although some confusion was created about the relationship
between tribal sovereignty and tribal title in the case of Cherokee
Nation, the source of that confusion was clarified by the Court in
the subsequent Worcester holding.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was a case of jurisdiction rather
than land, and did not affect the nature of tribal tenures. It in-
volved the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Arti-
cle III of the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for
himself (and perhaps the absent J. Duvall), created a source of
confusion that still plagues tribal rights when he stated:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an
unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the
lands they occupy, and that right shall be extinguished by a
voluntary cession to our government, yet it may be doubted
whether the tribes within the acknowledged boundaries of
the United States can, with strict accuracy, be dominated by
foreign nations [within the sense of the Federal Constitution].
They may, more correctly perhaps, be designated domestic
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we
must assert a title independent of their will, which must take
effect in point of possession when their right to possession
ceases. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian. " '
This paragraph contains two different statements. The first is a
property statement. It holds that tribes have an unquestionable
right to the lands they occupy until that possessory right is ex-
tinguished by a voluntary cession from the tribes to the federal
government. Also in this paragraph is an obscure reaffirmation of
the discovery principle: "[the tribes] occupy a territory of which
we must assert a title independent of their will, which must take
effect in point of possession when their right to possession ceases."
The second statement concerns political status: it holds that Indian
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tribes are not, in the sense of the Constitution, "foreign nations,"
but rather are labeled by Marshall as "domestic dependent na-
tions"-but nations nevertheless in American law.
The conceptualization of the analogy of ward to guardian has
since perplexed the legal profession. The central issue has not been
understood by subsequent courts, nor addressed by them, because
of the instrumental reading of federal powers by the federal
government and the federal courts. To illustrate the one-sided
nature of the federal interpretation of this clause in Cherokee
Nation, the concept of ward must be reviewed. There exist in legal
history and theory two potential definitions of wardship.'3' The
first is the Roman theory of wardship as a political relationship.
The second is an English theory of property, but the English in-
cidents of wardship were abolished by the Statute of Tenure in
1660, one hundred and seventy years before the opinion in
Cherokee Nation.
In Roman law, on the one hand, "wardship" was the political
status of semi-dependent house communities which attached
themselves to powerful lords and masters. "[W]e think of these
communities as walled round preserves," Professor Noyes writes
in his book, The Institution of Property, "within peace, without
war.""' It was necessary, especially for indigenous people under
Roman rule, for the "subject people to attach themselves to one or
another house in order to participate thus indirectly in the
economic and political advantages established by the
association."... This was most likely to occur where the indigenous
people under Roman rule were too numerous to be enslaved. The
concept of "ward" was derived from the Roman word tutela,
which means "to protect."'4 2 This was also the foundation of the
early Spanish and French recognition of the status of the Indians,
as in a "state of tutelage."'4 3
In the development of English feudal tenures, on the other hand,
wardship was a burden placed upon the land in an effort to main-
tain control."' The lord's rights of wardship arose, after feudal
rights became hereditary, when the tenant died leaving a minor
child as heir. During the child's minority, the lord was entitled to
the profits of the land of the ward and was not bound to account
for the profit from the land. "' The Magna Charta corrected this
abuse by providing that the lord holding by wardship should take
nothing more than customary produce and should maintain the
property in good condition. " ' But the Statute of Tenure in 1660
abolished wardship because of its abuse.1 7 Like the Spanish and
French concepts of tutelage, the feudal incident was in relation to
individual persons rather than political entities.
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When these two concepts are compared with the Chief Justice's
s;uggestive analogy in Cherokee Nation, it is obvious that he re-
ferred to the Roman version of wardship rather than the English
version in regard to the political relationship between the tribe and
the federal government. This is further evidenced by his reason-
ing, which followed the suggested analogy of political relation-
ship:
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief of their wants;
and address the president as their great father. They and their
country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire
their lands, or to form political connection with them, would
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act
of hostility.'
This discussion is actually only a restatement of the principle of
discovery and the right of the federal government to its entitle-
ment as against all other foreign powers. The unique argument is
the protection argument. Because this argument has been misinter-
preted as a surrender of power of the tribes to the federal govern-
ment, it is necessary to correct this assumption. In this regard it is
important to note that the Supreme Court of the United States in
its decision in Worcester v. Georgia, elaborately explained
"protection" in the following year. The Court held that protec-
tion, as applied to the Cherokee Nation, "involved, practically, no
claim to [their] land, land] no dominion over their person. ' Pro-
tection merely bound the tribe to the United States as a "depen-
dent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and
neighbor, and receiving the advantages of that protection,
without involving a surrender of their national character. .... '
Protection does not imply the destruction of the protected."'"' It
should be totally clear by now that wardship is a political relation-
ship that supports, rather than destroys, tribal tenurial systems, as
pronounced in M'Intosh. In fact, it strengthens tribal authority to
police its own internal land, based on original inherent sovereign-
ty.
In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall then reversed
the political status of tribes outlined in Cherokee Nation. Instead
of labeling the Cherokee Nation a "domestic dependent nation" in
the jurisprudential sense, he held as a matter of law under the
Constitution that: "The Indian nations had always been con-
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sidered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the
soil from time immemorial . ,,.", Marshall did not discuss the
doctrine of wardship in this case. He did, however, reject the in-
ference of Indians being subject to the Laws of the Master. ' The
solid inference is that he reversed his dicta in Cherokee Nation,
and considered his previous classification of "domestic dependent
nation" as overruled. Worcester was essentially the same case as
Cherokee Nation.
Chief Justice Marshall did not seem to find it necessary to make
any detailed analysis of tribal land tenures. This recognition of
tribal land tenures, while apparently consistent with the policies of
Congress and the Executive of the United States in the early nine-
teenth century, was clearly not dependent on these policies, but
rather a proposition recognized in the federal common law and
land tenure system."4 The recognition of tribal land tenures was
not dependent on the original constitutional status of the concern-
ed land: rather, the recognition of the distinct tribal tenures flow-
ed from the original natural rights of the tribe.5 Furthermore,
tribal tenure was not solely dependent upon treaty recognition of
Indian rights in land because such right survived the changes of
sovereignty and were qualified primarily by the restriction of
alienation inherent in the preemptive title of the United States.' 6
Under the classic paradigm the tribes had dominion. They had
not only possession but title and the right to self-government. In
relationship to the federal government, all cession or conveyances
of land were voluntary and consensual. The tribes had unlimited
rights to establish a land tenure system without interference from
the federal or state governments. The federal government held the
exclusive right to purchase the aboriginal title, but until such an
agreement was made with the tribes the federal government
guaranteed to control its citizens and prevent them from en-
croaching on tribal lands and establish exclusive trading
privileges."'
III. The Paradigmatic Shift in Tribal Title
The Riddle of Tribal Title
In contrast to the doctrinal clarity and uniformity of tribal title
in the classic paradigm embodied in the Marshall Court, the subse-
quent courts failed to understand its doctrine and its implications.
Tribal title and the significance of the holding in M'Intosh slowly
faded in the jurisprudential consciousness. The divergent Indian
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policies of Congress embodied in removal and allotments were the
major sources of decline for the theory of tribal title, but this is lit-
tle excuse for the courts' lack of analytical sophistication in cases
dealing with tribal property.
One of the best explanations, perhaps, for the development of
this riddle of tribal title was that the subsequent courts were less
concerned with the theoretical issues of land tenure and more con-
cerned with implementing a unitary theory of federal title; they
were concerned with formalistically filling in the gaps in the
outline of American land tenure systems, not in questioning those
systems' very existence. These courts viewed tribal title as transi-
tional, and a major influence on this transitional theory was the
mandates of the policies of manifest destiny and the melting-pot
ideology. The best illustration of the results of this transitional
theory is embodied in the works of Felix H. Cohen, the first
scholar of Indian law, who failed to understand the insights of the
classic paradigm of tribal title. Much of his intellectual oversight
was undoubtedly due to his preoccupation of attempting to merge
tribal title under federal title, rather than keeping conceptual
fidelity to separate land tenure systems. This preoccupation is em-
bodied in his 1942 book, Federal Indian Law.' In the Langdellian
case-analysis tradition of legal scholarship, Cohen attempted to
forge an explanatory principle of aboriginal title under federal
land tenure, establishing the modern riddle of tribal title. Thus, he
states:
Cases and opinions subsequent to the M'Intosh case oscillate
between a stress on the content of Indian possessory right
and stress on the limitation of that right. These opinions and
cases might perhaps be classified according to whether they
refer to the Indian right of occupancy as "mere" right of oc-
cupancy or as a "sacred" right of occupancy. All the cases,
however, agree in saying that the aboriginal Indian title in-
volves an exclusive right of occupancy and does not involve
an ultimate fee. .... ,'
Much of the riddle of aboriginal title in Federal Indian Law sur-
rounds this misreading of M'Intosh. M'Intosh was read as
establishing a principle of federal title and as not recognizing tribal
title. '60
While teaching at Yale Law School, Cohen reevaluated the rid-
dle of tribal title. "[Tihe dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint in
this case was not based upon any defect in the Indian's title,"
Cohen acknowledged in his article, "Original Indian Title," con-
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cerning MIntosh, "but solely upon the invalidity of the Indian
deed through which the white plaintiffs claimed title. "16' He failed
to explain that the deed was not invalid, but that the subsequent
unrestricted treaty abrogated all rights the white plaintiffs held
under tribal dominion. His preoccupation with the unity of federal
title hindered his discernment of the separate tenurial system in-
herent in the classic paradigm. "[Tihe federal government and the
Indians both had exclusive title to the same land at the same time,"
was the Pickwickian conclusion Cohen elucidated from the deci-
sion in MIntosh. '6 Hence, a federal grant of Indian lands could
convey an interest, but this conveyed interest was not possessory
interest until the federal government extinguished the possessory
interest of the tribes.'" The insight that the extinguishment of
tribal title was necessary before the federal government could con-
vey an interest remained, but in a different form than before, .e.,
in terms of possession, not title. This step is important to an
understanding of the paradigmatic shift in tribal title.
Equally as important to the emergence of the modern paradigm
of tribal title were the vacillating congressional policies in Indian
affiars, in particular, the land policies inherent in the removal
policy'" and in the general allotment acts." These vacillating
policies were compounded by the federal courts' surprisingly
mechanical applications of jurisprudence. Searching for fun-
damental principles in law, the courts treated all tribes as similar
before the courts, and failed to understand or distinguish between
the concepts of aboriginal title and tribal title under federal title.
In terms of our analysis of tribal title, both of these responses by
the legal system were detrimental to the tribes and to a juridical
understanding of the classic paradigm of tribal title. The implica-
tions of the removal policy in terms of tribal title were the most
obfuscating for policy, while allotment was the most turbid.
Removal of Indian tribes from the southeast to Indian Territory
extinguished their aboriginal tribal title, and the land to which
they were moved was land to which the federal government had
already extinguished the indigenous tribes' aboriginal title and
brought under federal dominion. The legal effect of such ex-
tinguishment of aboriginal title by the federal government was to
bring the land under congressional authority through the property
clause of the Constitution." The fact that Congress decided to
reserve this land for the removed Indian tribes does not negate the
congressional power to establish distributive rules and regulations
for land tenure (i.e., allotments or common tribal property);
rather, it strengthened the police power of Congress over Indian
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tribes. The only limitation on this power was in reference to
aboriginal tribes occupying a section of their aboriginal land
through consensual agreements with the federal government.
The removal of the Five Civilized Tribes to Indian Territory is a
pertinent example for analysis. Upon removal from their
aboriginal territory in the southeast, the Five Civilized Tribes ac-
quired land from the United States in conformity with treaties and
agreements that provided for a fee simple patent to the tribes for
their members. '67 There was a subsequent condition: that the fee
simple patent exist so long as the tribes continued to occupy the
land.' In legal effect, the Five Civilized Tribes had secured from
the United States the fee to the lands they occupied, and had con-
verted the right of aboriginal title under tribal dominion to a fee
simple tribal estate under the dominion of the United States. This
did not affect their right to self-government or sovereignty
because that authority originated in the inherent consent of the
tribal members to vest allegiance in the tribe, versus the federal or
state governments.'69 Likewise, the converting of aboriginal title to
fee simple did not affect the tribes' rights to establish land tenure
systems, but land tenure systems so established were subject to the
extended police power of Congress over territories under the Con-
stitution because the land tenure system emanated from the United
States rather than strictly from tribal dominion.
Under the land tenure system of the United States, Congress
Could and did unilaterally regulate tribal land by legislation.' 0 It
extinguished the fee simple title of those tribes aligning themselves
with the Confederated States of America during the Civil War.'' It
mandated the division of tribal land into allotments in severalty
among the members of the removed tribes. It granted lands to the
railroads, and for other federal purposes, with some compensa-
tion paid to the individuals as well as to the tribes.7 ' These
unilateral congressional acts rested on the sole authority that the
land was not aboriginal land under tribal dominion, but rather
territories that emanated from the United States and which were
regulated by Congress.'73
In contrast to the allotment policy of tribal land held under
Federal tenure is the allotment of aboriginal title. An example of
this policy is found in the Sioux Indian tribes of the High Plains.'7
The Sioux reservations were aboriginal tribal title, expressly
reserved in their treaties with the federal government.' In order to
implement the allotment policy in this context, the federal govern-
ment had to obtain the consent of three-fourths of the male tribal
members pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of 1868."- The mere
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fact that the tribal lands were divided did not extinguish the
aboriginal title to the lands. If the allotments were perfected by the
federal government and transferred in fee simple to the individual
tribal members, then the land passed from aboriginal tribal title to
a fee simple estate under federal title. Congress, however, ended
the allotment policy in 1934, and reestablished a policy of con-
solidating land under tribal ownership.'
Allotted land on aboriginal tribal reservations is called trust
patented land rather than restricted fee land. The distinction is im-
portant. Trust patented land corresponds to allotments in
aboriginal tribal title, while restricted fee corresponds to tribal ti-
tle under federal land tenure. Trust patent land, on the one hand,
usually denotes the fact that the United States has not perfected its
entitlement but has ultimate fee." 8 Restricted fee, on the other
hand, involves the holding of legal fee by an allottee under federal
title, but subject to federal restrictions. '9
While the distinction between aboriginal tribal reservations and
lands under federal title is important, it does not affect or modify
the ultimate fee title of the United States, which is the power to ex-
tinguish tribal title. But the tribal holding of aboriginal title does
more narrowly limit the power of Congress over tribal dominion,
and over the tribal police power over tribal members and their
allotments under tribal tenures, even though these lands are still
subject to the ultimate fee of the United States. The appropriate
test of congressional power in an original title reservation
established under the Indian Reorganization Act is clearly upheld
by Justice Van Devanter in Chippewa Indians v. United States:
Our decisions, while recognizing that the government has
power to control and manage the property and affairs of its
Indian wards in good faith for their welfare, show that this
power is subject to constitutional limitations and does not
enable the government to give the lands of one tribe or band
to another or to deal with them as its own. '
Furthermore, under the Indian Reorganization Act which ended
allotment, the tribes were given concurrent jurisdiction to regulate
their civil affairs."' The preamble of the Indian Self-Determination
Act has recently reaffirmed this concurrent jurisdiction and
established federal policy more congruent with tribal control."'
The Paradigmatic Shift: Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United-States
At the height of the termination period of federal Indian policy,
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a divided Supreme Court inaugurated the shift in the legal
paradigm of "Indian title of Occupancy" under the guise of follow-
ing M'Intosh and the older precedent of tribal title. The Court
held in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States that the property
rights established by occupancy "since time immemorial" by the
natives of Alaska were not legal property rights under American
law: rather, that such occupancy was permissive occupancy.
'
18
Under this distinction, the rights of occupancy could be canceled
unilaterally by Congress at its discretion, without compensation
to the native clans or tribes.
This theory, although much criticized by the legal profession,
established the modern paradigm of tribal title of occupancy as a
naked possession. More importantly, the reasoning of the Court is
an example of the confusion accorded the M'Intosh opinion by the
modern Supreme Court when it fails to adhere to the conceptual
Fidelity of the classic paradigm, which was an attempt to reconcile
the two complementary land tenure systems, tribal and federal. It
is the problem of categorical reasoning on paradigmatic assump-
tion in law, rather than attempting to adhere to conceptual and
precedential fidelity. The riddle of tribal title which haunted the
legal commentators finally emerged clearly in the case of
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, creating the modern
paradigm of tribal title.
The land in question in Tee-Hit-Ton was aboriginal tribal land,
but the Court treated the land as if it had emanated from the
United States as in the situation of removed tribes. The United
States had acquired the territory from Russia by a treaty in 1867,
and the Court held that this treaty transfer was sufficient to ex-
tinguish aboriginal tribal title.I" The Court of Claims had reached
a contrary conclusion that the tribal interest existed prior to the
Alaskan purchase, and termed this title "original Indian title," or
"Indian right of Occupancy.'"" It also determined that this original
Indian title was not recognized by Congress; therefore, the Indians
had no legal right to the land under the Constitution.'" The
Supreme Court never questioned the notion that aboriginal title
exists within the land tenure system of the United States, not as a
recognized principle of law concerning separate land tenure
systems, as asserted in M'Intosh, but rather as possession unless
recognized as a property right by the United States. It was a crea-
tion of the decision-a misunderstanding of both the classic
paradigm and the significance of the subsequent cases that follow-
ed the holdings of the classic paradigm.
This is a clear example of how to perfect title to lands taken not
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by fraud, duress, or other illegal means, but rather by assertion of
a unitary federal tenure test, and finding no evidence of title under
the created judicial test. It does not address itself to the situation
where the United States has not attempted to perfect its en-
titlements purchased from Russia by further purchasing the tribal
title, but, indeed, asserts the right to limit an aboriginal right by a
recognition test independent of the extinguishing of tribal title. In
this fact situation before the Court, the correct judicial test should
have been controlled by Section 177 of the United States Code:
e.g., the Court should have asked whether the treaty between
Russia and the United States was "subject to Indian title," as it did
in M'Intosh regarding treaty transfers from foreign nations to the
United States.
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The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, a clan of the Tlingit tribes whose land
was in question, argued to the Court that they had either a "full
proprietary ownership" in land, or "at least a recognized right to
restricted possession, occupation, and use..'. Any such confisca-
tion of these property rights by the United States was therefore
compensable under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.'9 In
opposition, the government argued that the Indians' claim to the
land was not compensable because their interest was merely a
right to use the land at the government's pleasure." The govern-
ment also stressed the fact the Congress had never recognized any
legal interest of Indians in their land. '1 The Supreme Court agreed
with the position of the government."2 Through the framing of the
issues in this case, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians were caught in the
legal riddle of Indian title.
The test of congressional recognition of aboriginal title assumes
the issues which are before the Court.' 3 It is founded on legal
presumption that the federal government must have the burden of
proof of purchase of tribal title; absent such proof, the legal
presumption ought to have been that the property remains in
tribal dominion and land tenure systems. This, at essence, is the
error of the recognition test. It was created and applied to the
wrong fact situation.
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton realized that there was no particular
form of congressional recognition of "Indian rights of permanent
occupancy,"'9 and that such recognition might be established in a
variety of ways. However, it still held that there must be "the
definite intention by congressional action or authority to accord
legal rights not merely permissive occupancy."' 9 The standard the
Court utilized was that where Congress, by treaty or other agree-
ment, has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the land
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permanently, compensation must then be paid for subsequent
taking. 9
This was not the question before the Court at all. The recogni-
t:ion test is not concerned directly with aboriginal title. It is con-
cerned with conveyances and reservations of aboriginal title by
either treaty or agreements in which the United States has
guaranteed to the tribes certain lands. These consensual con-
veyances create legal rights which the tribe can enforce against
congressional action. But if no conveyance has been entered into
by the tribe, the federal government, in order to acquire rights to
the aboriginal title, must purchase it. If the government refuses to
purchase, then the land resides under tribal dominion. Any taking
of aboriginal land without purchase is blatant confiscation. The
Court did not interpret the fifth amendment as imposing limita-
tions on actions by the federal government but rather as concern-
ing the nature of the property being confiscated. This is a bizarre
reading of the fifth amendment.
The advocates for the tribes, faced with the recognition test,
maintained that both the Organic Act of Alaska and the act pro-
viding for civil government for Alaska sufficiently recognized the
permanence of the clan title to best legal rights.
The eighth section of the Organic Act stated:
That the Indians or other persons in said district shall not be
disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in their use
or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under
which such persons may.acquire title to such lands is reserved
for future legislation by Congress .... 9'
The act for civil government reaffirms the Organic Act, stating:
"The Indians or persons conducting schools or missions in the
district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any land now
actually in their use and occupancy. ... '99 The Court of Appeals
had previously determined that this act constituted recognition of
Indian ownership.w The Supreme Court, however, held that
neither of these statutes nor pertinent legislation indicated any
such intention by Congress to "grant to the Indians any permanent
rights in the lands of Alaska occupied by them by permission of
Congress. Rather, it clearly appears that what was intended was
merely to retain the status quo until further congressional or
judicial action was taken .... ""0 In short, the Court inaugurated a
new judicial test of aboriginal property: the legal theory that Con-
gress has the sole right to delegate to the Indian tribes their rights
to aboriginal titles. Aboriginal title did not exist, then, because of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/3
the tribes' "original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of
the soil from time immemorial," as stated in Worcester. 2 Rather,
under the Court's new theory of aboriginal title, it was vested in
Congress! This is a juridical fiction that is completely refuted by
all the classic cases of Indian law, grounded as they are in the no-
tion of inherent title rather than in recognized or delegated
aboriginal title.
If the Court's case is correct in that aboriginal title needs con-
gressional recognition in order to be permanent, why did the
Court in M'Intosh establish in such painstaking detail that
discovery granted the right to acquire tribal title through pur-
chases7 This recognition test allows the Court to ignore the fun-
damental principles of intertenurial transfer of property
established in M'Intosh.
The first question in the Court's rationale is the theory that the
Organic Act merely intended to retain the status quo. This implies
maintenance of property rights, but the Court rejects its own in-
ferences. In assessing the status quo inference of the Tee-Hit-Ton
Court, the chain of title theory of M'Intosh and Worcester must
be seriously reexamined. "[N]either the Declaration of In-
dependence, nor the treaties confirming it," the Court held in
MIntosh, "could give us more than that which we before
possessed, or to which Great Britain was before entitled."2" This is
a clear judicial validation that the rights established under Great
Britain and under the federal government survive the changes in
sovereignty. The Court continued:
It has never been doubted that either the United States or the
several states, had a clear title to all the lands within the
boundary lines described in the treaty [between the United
States and Great Britain], subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that
right was vested in that government which might constitu-
tionally exercise it. 4
Similarly, when the M'Intosh Court discussed the legal effect of
the treaty transfer of entitlements between France and Great Bri-
tain in 1763, the Court concluded that:
It had never been supposed that [Great Britain] surrendered
nothing although she was not in actual possession of a foot of
land. She surrendered all right to acquire country [from the
aboriginal Indian tribes]; and any after attempts to purchase
it from the Indians, would have been considered and treated
as an invasion of the territory of France. °
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There is nothing in the terms of the treaty transfer from Russia to
the United States which could make such a conveyance not subject
to extinguishing Indian title, similar to the fact situation in
MU'Intosh.' The treaty by rights should have established an en-
titlement to purchase Indian title-not a perfected title.
The status quo inference the Court creates and then takes so
lightly is, in effect, a validation of tribal dominion and unex-
tinguished aboriginal title of the Indians, as well as the rights of
other persons under either tribal dominion or Russian law which
survive the change of sovereignty. It is those status quo rights
which are vested under the Organic Act of Alaska. Under the
Court's theory in Tee-Hit-Ton, however, no person-Indian or
non-Indian- has any legal rights to land in Alaska; all were total-
ly abolished by the change of sovereignty. If the Court interpreted
this statute as merely limited to the Indians and not to the "other
persons," then such an interpretation would be violative of the
equal protection of law under the Constitution."°
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton next utilized the "further congres-
sional action" test as the second part of its recognition test ra-
tionale to defeat tribal title. However, this test does not refer to
tribal title, but to "other persons." Section 177 of the United States
Code expressly provides procedures for the extinguishing of
aboriginal title by the federal government."° The only remaining
procedures this further action contemplates is the offer of lands for
public land sale, Le., the distribution of extinguished tribal lands
by the federal government to other citizens. Implicit in the
Organic Act, as well as the act for civil government in Alaska, is
the recognition that unless the federal government extinguishes
tribal title, such title is as permanent as the law recognizes and
vested in the Indian tribes. This concept is consistent with federal
Indian law, with the chain of title theory of M'Intosh, the classic
paradigm of tribal title, and with the property theories of Locke
regarding the relationship between property and government in
the modern liberal state.
The Court's analysis of Indian title also suffers from the same
legal errors as the recognition test. Original Indian title was
equated with "permission from the whites to occupy" lands, rather
than as an original natural right of the tribes, as in the holdings of
l.'Intosh and Worcester. Moreover, the Court stated,
[original Indian title] means mere possession not specifically
recognized as ownership by Congress. After conquest they
were permitted to occupy portions of territory over which
they had previously exercised "sovereignty" as we use that
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term. This is not a property right but amounts to a right of
occupancy which the sovereign grants and protects against
intrusions by third parties but which rights of occupancy
may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the
sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligations to
compensate the Indians."'
The authority of the Court for such a sweeping conclusion of law
was no less than "the great case" of Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
MIntosh. 21'
In Tee-Hit-Ton, M'Intosh was cited for the legal proposition
"that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian ti-
tle of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest," 21' and for the
proposition that it "denied the power of an Indian tribe to pass
their right of occupancy to another."... Moreover, the Court held
that M'Intosh stands for a "rule" not even before the Court, i.e.,
that the taking by the United States of unrecognized Indian title is
not compensable under the fifth amendment." ' Except for the pro-
position that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish tribal
title, these holdings and interpretations are not correct. This was a
clear abuse of precedent by the Court.
To understand the inadequacy of the conquest theory of the
Court's decision in relation to aboriginal title in Tee-Hit-Ton, it
should be noted that Fletcher v. Peck, M'Intosh, and Worcester
all rejected conquest as a source of land title. In fact, in United
States v. Percheman, Chief Justice Marshall restated the same
legal principle he had established in M'Intosh:
It may not be unworthy of remark that it is very unusual,
even in the cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more
than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the
country. The modern usage of nation, which has become
law, could be violated; that sense of justice and of right
which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world
would be outraged, if private property should be generally
confiscated, and private rights annulled."'
Yet, this is precisely the theory which the Tee-Hit-Ton decision
used to defeat tribal title, in spite of a conspicuous lack of warfare
between the United States and the Alaskan natives which might
thereby justify such a theory of conquest. 1 ' The theory of con-
quest was popularized in FederalIndian Law and not in any of the
classic cases of Indian law. In Federal Indian Law, it is stated that
conquest ends external sovereignty, but does not affect internal
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sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the regulating source for land
tenure and distribution, and such land tenure regulation is not an
attribute of external sovereignty.216 The Tee-Hit-Ton Court infers
that conquest refers to property, not political sovereignty. This
was the crux of the Court's error: it was implicit in the Court's
reasoning, but never articulated in the opinion. It operated, in
short, on the assumptive level. The conceptual confusion, itself a
form of legal mysticism, was the result of assuming the tribal title
of occupancy was under the tenurial system of the United States.
Cohen's theory is that
[C]onquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power
of the United States and in substance, terminates the external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter in-
to treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local
self-government. 7
But the Cohen book also states that "it is only by positive enact-
ments, even in the cases of conquered and subdued nations, that
their laws are changed by the conqueror. ' "18 Thus, in Tee-Hit-Ton,
the legal presumption should have been that unless there exists a
congressional statute abolishing aboriginal title, not only should
the courts assume that the clan title was recognized by Congress,
but that such title must be purchased from the tribe as the sole
means of perfecting the United States entitlements in Alaska. Con-
quest did not limit the internal sovereignty of the tribes, which is
where the right to tribal power over property resides; it merely
limits the entitlements of other European nations.
The last and most fundamental issue was the identification of
aboriginal title as the equivalent of "occupancy" in modern legal
theory. With the absence of any detailed examination of tribal
tenurial systems, the Court merely assumed that tribal title of oc-
cupancy was analogous to the term "occupancy" under American
tenurial systems. The presumption that the tribal titles of owner-
ship must be basically the same as occupancy in American tenurial
systems finally helps us make sense out of the tortured opinion
given in Tee-Hit-Ton. The Marshall Court took great pains to
avoid describing tribal tenurial systems within the technical
language of the estates of England and the United States. Mar-
shall's contrast between tribal tenurial systems of land and those
within Anglo-American law was not only an act of great judicial
sensitivity, but also an attempt to prevent subsequent courts from
concluding that Indian tribes did in fact possess a fee simple, as
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Justice Johnson concluded in Fletcher v. Peck. By utilizing the
term "Indian title of Occupancy," the Marshall Court had attemp-
ted to prevent subsequent courts from arriving at any conclusion
which might be seen as either a limitation on the original
sovereignty of the tribes, or as destroying the exclusive federal en-
titlement to purchase tribal title. To describe tribal rights in the
technical language of American law would have been misleading,
as the Court was here distinguishing tribal dominion from federal
dominion.2 9
The inappropriateness of equating aboriginal tribal title with
"occupancy" as defined under American property law becomes all
the more clear when it is realized that the Court revised the classic
paradigm of tribal title without explanations or elaborations. It
violated the classic paradigm's differentiation of tribal tenurial
systems from the federal tenurial system: the two paradigms were
seen as compatible within a single tenurial system in Tee-Hit -Ton.
The British Privy Council, in the spirit of M'Intosh, addressed
the nature of the interpretive error the Tee-Hit-Ton Court
blundered into in Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary S. Nigeria in
1921. In that case the lordship observed that:
In interpreting the native title to land, not only in Southern
Nigeria but in other parts of the British Empire, much caution
is essential. There is a tendency, operating at times un-
consciously, to render that title conceptually in terms which
are appropriate only to the systems which have grown up
under English law. But this tendency has to be held in check
closely. As a rule, in the various systems of native
jurisprudence throughout the Empire, there is no such full
division between property and possession as English lawyers
are familiar with."'
Here, then, is precisely the problem with the decision in
Tee-Hit-Ton. The Court confused the aboriginal title of occupan-
cy with the American concepts of occupancy and possession,
which have their own technical connotations in American tenurial
interests in real property, particularly in juxtaposition with the
terms "fee simple" and "proprietary." In short, the Court
employed the American terms to the concept, which the Marshall
Court so studiously avoided doing, and the American terms bear
only a superficial resemblance to the meanings of the tribal con-
cepts. "All proprietary rights are not equal in sanctity," warned
Justice Tawney, "merely because identical in name."'2 The central
difficulty with the Court's opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton is that its core
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is assertion rather than reasoned explanation. The Court's ap-
proach to explanation is its assertion that it follows M'Intosh and
precedent, whereas in reality it merely assumes the conclusions it
purports to derive.
The Predicament of the Modern Paradigm
"The law," states Charles Miller, "is not majestic enough in the
American system to endure for good but unexplained or unex-
plainable reason."'" The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
tribal title of occupancy in Tee-Hit-Ton raises the question of
judicial sincerity and commitment to neutral principles and prece-
dent in law. Judicial opinions are the most permanent and public
manifestation of the legal system. What counts in the public life of
the judicial system is the process by which the Court reaches its
decisions and formulates its reasoning into the decision, i.e., an
opinion of a form of public communication. For this communica-
tion to be functional and credible in modern society, the opinions
of the Court must ultimately be accepted for the actual justifica-
tion that was offered to the public, regardless of how the decisions
came about or how the opinions happen to be written. When the
reasoning of an opinion fails to adequately support the decision in
a particular case, the entire judicial process suffers. Both the
absence of reasoning in the form of coherent argument and the un-
principled use of precedent are detrimental to the Court's legal
function, as well as its political role in the legal system.2"
The Tee-Hit-Ton decision is assumptive. It commits most of the
errors of judicial reasoning. It creates a legal test of recognition,
which before was merely a legal fact and not a clearly defined test,
and then applies the new test to the wrong fact situation.
Moreover, it does not justify or elaborate on the test nor on its im-
plications. Furthermore, the decision of the Court ignored the con-
gressional scheme for acquiring aboriginal tribal title embodied in
Section 177 of the United States Code. Next, the decision molds a
folk notion of conquest into a theory of extinguishing aboriginal
tribal title, which had never been validated in American law prior
to its decision. The Court ignored the doctrine of purchase of
aboriginal title, which is the basis of federal title and which creates
the assumption that validates tribal title as a property interest.
Not content with creating the conquest theory of aboriginal title,
the Court once again applied a theory to an incorrect fact situa-
tion: the Alaskan natives never had any military warfare with the
United States. Lastly, the Court confused the definition of oc-
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cupancy in American law with the wording of "Indian title of Oc-
cupancy" in the classic paradigm without any reasoned elabora-
tion.
After totally destroying the legal sophistication of the classic
paradigm, the Court inferred that payment for the lands of the
Tee-Hit-Ton clans resided in Congress rather than the Court.
Traditionally, the Court has been the sole authority on determin-
ing the nature of property interests. By inferring that the question
of determining aboriginal title is a political question, the tribes
were deprived of their right to have a judicial determination of
their property interest like other citizens of groups in the United
States. Also, this theory is of questionable constitutional validity.
It is a situation where the governmental entity which is alleged to
have taken one's land is also the entity to determine whether or
not the thing taken was protected by the Constitution. This ap-
proach to justice is contrary to the theory of separation of power
in the federal government, as well as the notion of the importance
of an independent judiciary in the modern liberal state.
The decision in Tee-Hit-Ton illustrates clearly that law is a
practical science even at the highest levels. The Court does not
dwell on fundamental questions concerning land tenure embodied
in case law, or the political and economic functions of the existing
legal order. Content with the implicit working assumptions of the
common law, legal scholarship and litigation move rapidly to the
more current and tractable questions. But when the solutions to
social problems offered by the law then fail to satisfy society, it
becomes necessary to examine the fundamental theories from
which the legal paradigms are derived, and to thereby contrast the
fundamental decisions with the working assumptions. w' The
paradigmatic shift in tribal title of occupancy is such a situation,
and thereby demands a reformation of the basic theory.
It is submitted that there is no way to unite the paradigm in-
herent in the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion with its authority, Le., "the
great case" of M'Intosh. In both legal and economic effect, the
classic paradigm is not only different from the modern paradigm
but the better of the two. The classic paradigm, on the one hand,
grants the tribe both proprietary and governmental power, i.e.,
tribal dominion. The modern paradigm, on the other hand,
establishes the theory that proprietary powers are derivative of
the federal government's recognition, not the original natural
rights of tribes. Moreover, the modern paradigm holds that
aboriginal title is of no economic value, or at the most of little
value. Ironically, the economic value of aboriginal property in the
modern paradigm is the equivalent of owning a dream.
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In terms of the relationship between governmental power and
proprietary power, the Court appeared to have developed a
federal instrumentality test. The aboriginal land may be protected
against third parties because it furthers a federal purpose. But that
purpose is largely directed toward maintaining the special rela-
tionship of the Indian tribes and clans to the federal government.
The serious defect in the instrumental property doctrine is that it
makes all tribal power a function of federal policy, just as it makes
all aboriginal lands a function of a federal recognition test. Both
leave little room for independent tribal initiative in self-
determination and economic development.
The recognition test for either tribal power or for social benefits
has recently been in disfavor in the Court.' In Oneida Indian Na-
tion v. County of Oneida, the Court used the recognition test of
Tee-Hit-Ton when it discussed the significance of Section 177 of
the United States Code. The Court stated:
It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that
although fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign-first the
discovering European nations and later the original states
and the United States-a right of occupancy in the Indian
tribes was nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes
called Indian title and good against all but the sovereign,
could be terminated only by sovereign act. Once the United
States was organized and the Constitution adopted, these
tribal rights to Indian land became the exclusive province of
the federal law. Indian title, recognized to be only a right of
occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United States.
The Federal Government took early steps to deal with the In-
dians through treaty, the principal purpose often being to
recognize and guarantee the rights of Indians to specific areas
of land.'
While the Court still considered Indian title to be a right of oc-
cupancy under American property law, the error inherent in
Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court did nevertheless render the recognition
questionable. Oneida Indian Nation holds that the right of oc-
cupancy was directly recognized by the federal government at the
creation of the United States and that the treaties only recognize
and guarantee the rights of Indians to specific areas of land. This
is a correct reading of the cases which the Tee-Hit-Ton Court
misinterpreted. Recognition of aboriginal title cannot be
delegated. The tribes may consent, in one form or another, to the
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establishment of a reservation, Le., a specific area of land-but
this is extinguishment of general aboriginal lands, not all
aboriginal rights. The Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, from
which Section 177 of the United States Code is derivative, is
recognition of aboriginal title. A strong argument can be made
that the Act established an uninterrupted principle that Indian
tribes were to enjoy special property rights with respect to
aboriginal lands significantly different from those granted to
federal lands. Protections against the taking of real property rights
of individuals and groups under the federal land tenure system are
embodied in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, and protec-
tions for estates under state land tenure systems are in the four-
teenth amendment. But tribal lands under a tribal tenure system
were guaranteed protection under the Indian Non-Intercourse
Act, which is part of the trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian tribes even in the absence of a formal treaty.
Under the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, the tribes are guaranteed
that their lands are recognized by the federal government, and the
fifth amendment is then utilized to prevent the federal government
from taking tribal lands without compensation. This is the proper
reading of the federal statutory scheme. It should be remembered
that the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers and
the fifth amendment is directed at federal action.
The modern paradigm of tribal title clashes with the entire
statutory scheme of Congress for regulating land purchases and
with the fifth amendment of the Constitution. It clashes with the
classic paradigm of tribal title and with economic theory. But,
more importantly, it violates the theory of treaty federalism
derived from the classic paradigm. It should be steadfastly
remembered that the Indian tribes entered into treaties with the
United States under the expectation of retaining their original
natural rights of sovereignty and land tenure under the classic
paradigm. It was their reliance on these principles that created a
political relationship with the federal government, not any show
of military might.
The tribes accepted the fact that they would not have immediate
representation in Congress, and that being a separate people
would rob them of political speech in the federal government. The
main incentive for their entering into treaties, then, was to secure
independence from external governmental oppression. From this
tribal perspective the overruling of any of the holdings of the
classic paradigm is a violation of the integrity of the United States.
If changes are necessary, then tribes should be granted direct
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representation in the Senate to compensate for their loss of
political liberty and cultural integrity. It must be understood that
as with the relationship of the Magna Charta to English society,
and the Bill of Rights to American society, the treaties and the
classic paradigm create rights sacred to the Indian tribes. These
sacred rights should not be overruled by implication or by er-
roneous interpretation by the courts or Congress. It is a matter of
integrity. This is the predicament of tribal title in the modern
paradigm.
IV. Tribal Title in the Unconcluded Present
In the previous section, efforts have been made to illustrate the
errors originating in the modern paradigm of tribal title in com-
parison to the classic paradigm. This was necessary because the
United States Supreme Court justified its holding in the
Tee-Hit-Ton decision as mandated by and consistent with the
classic paradigm of tribal title. It is here reiterated that the modern
paradigm is a sharp and distinguishable break with the classic
paradigm and not justified in legal reasoning or reality. If the
analysis of the distinction between the classic paradigm and the
modern paradigm of tribal title-underlying the argument in this
paper-is correct, then revision is needed in the basic institutional
arrangements between the Indian tribes and the federal govern-
rent. Congress has created the legal environment for the change
by stressing the rights of self-determination and economic
development. The courts should follow this policy and allow the
t:ibal judiciary on "aboriginal title" reservations to develop a
theory of tribal land tenure without interference from the federal
government's wardship or the newer trusteeship arguments. Other
changes are also necessary, but these are dependent upon the
status of the reservation lands, i.e., whether the lands are
aboriginal tribal lands or tribal lands under federal tenure. This
conclusion will be limited to a brief discussion of the theory of
tribal land tenure and its relationship to trusteeship.
The Court has validated that the tribal governments exercise
both proprietary and government power, but rarely do they com-
bine these powers in any one decision. Some courts assume that
tribal power is essentially proprietary and limit all tribal activities
accordingly, while others assume that tribal power is essentially a
police power and not proprietary. "7 This has created its own
special confusion in an area of law known for its inconsistencies.
In establishing a tribal theory of land tenure, both powers must
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be combined. If the modern paradigm of tribal title as "naked
possession" is incorrect as a matter of law and precedent, then a
return to the concept of tribal dominion as conceptualized and
delineated in the classic paradigm is appropriate. Tribal dominion
under the classic paradigm in contemporary society would again
combine the two powers of proprietary (or executory) power and
governmental (regulatory) powers. Tribal government, a public
form of ownership, would include the powers of disposal, regula-
tion and administration of land tenures, and distribution of
assignments, as well as the power to create business entities for ex-
ploitation of private property for public benefit.
While the police power of the tribe (an original, inherent, and
residual power which cannot be lost except by consent of the tribal
citizens) would largely depend on the ends to which it is applied as
well as the limitations embodied in the Indian Civil Rights Act, it
should be interpreted the same as the police power of the several
states. This would include the power to regulate entry and loca-
tion, or to determine licensing for businesses and zoning, the
power to appropriate and distribute land, the power to supervise
competition in contract and property law as well as environmental
damage, and the power to compact (which is analogous to the
proprietary contract).
Because of the implications of the modern paradigm, these
distinct tribal powers, which are complementary to reservation
economic development and stable tribal government, have been
confused by reference to ownership. Regulatory or police power is
implicit in the consensual nature of modern society and tribal
society, but it is analytically distinct from and unrelated to land
ownership. Ownership thinking is most dangerously reflected in
those cases in which the courts differentiate tribal jurisdiction on
the basis of the three general classes of reservation land tenure
pursuant to federal law: tribal, trust allotments, and fee patents.
There are few cases where jurisdiction attaches only to tribal land
under the modern paradigm of tribal title, but most courts have
attempted to draw a line between trust property and fee lands.
Another test the courts utilize is the race of the owner of land
within the reservation or the allegiance of the owner. In other
words, the test for jurisdiction over Indians on tribal reservations
is territoriality, while for non-Indians the test is ownership of
land, consent to tribal jurisdiction, or absolute immunities. These
lines of distinction are based on the nonrecognition of the pro-
prietary power in the modern paradigm which leaves the tribe
with mere governmental power to regulate. These distinctions
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under the classic paradigm should be nonexistent- they are linger-
ing vestiges of the outmoded federal policy of gradually submit-
ting Indians as individuals to the jurisdiction of the states by eas-
ing them into state property-owner and taxpayer status. Under the
authority of the classic paradigm, the tribes should have the pro-
prietary power to regulate this land use, as well as the governmen-
tal power, without regard to the status of the land.
This theory will necessarily clash with the federal policy of
trusteeship. But this problem is part historical and part illusory
under the modern theory of property in the United States. In its
doctrinal essence, trusteeship is designed primarily to protect the
title of that land and to preserve the land in Indian ownership, but
the trustee role has never been well defined." Two different
theories have been advanced by the United States to limit the
power of disposal, both ultimately seeking justification in some
need for protection. First, it is said that trusteeship is derived from
the decision of the Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation. This
theory is questionable at best, as shown in earlier attempts at
illustration." ° Nowhere in the classic paradigm of tribal dominion
and title did the Court assert that there existed absolute federal
authority to dispose of or regulate tribal assets without their con-
sent. The second theory is that trusteeship is alleged to be inherent
in treaties. This argument is also subject to question. In Worcester
v. Georgia, the Court stressed that treaties do not grant unlimited
power to the federal government."
Actually, every citizen of the United States holds his land sub-
ject to the authority of the United States. Private property, which
was originally sanctioned as control over property, has now
almost entirely disappeared in American property law. The theory
replacing control is that of protections. A system of contract rela-
tions is based solely upon the foundation of material objects and
requires and obtains from the law a system of protections in rela-
tion to these objects. In this paradigm, property is conceived as
that specialized organization which functions primarily for pur-
poses that society now calls "economic." Property exists as a
system of functional relations between citizens and the state with
regard to material objects. The relationships are defined by the
philosophy of law as claims, privileges, powers and immunities
and their correlatives, duties, and the like. The tenure system in
the United States, then, largely consists of protections, or viewed
in another way, of limited permissions from the state. A right
under this tenurial system is guaranteed against other persons, not
as against the state. This new property relationship has led many
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/3
commentators to conclude that what an individual actually owns
is rights to use of resources .
2
Under this theory, the tribes are in a position equal to other
governments to determine their residents' rights of use of resources
within the boundaries of the reservation. They do not have this
right, due to the modern paradigm and to a translegal problem in
legal theory. When federal control of tribal property originated, it
appeared drastic in comparison to the private property control
theory. It caught the attention of the legal profession. Under the
modern theory of protection, however, trusteeship is not as novel
as it once was; hence, there is no reason why tribal property is dif-
ferent in terms of federal regulation and control than con-
dominium communities or shareholders of a corporation. The
crucial distinction between tribal communities and these entities is
that tribal tenure is still distinct from federal tenure and the
original natural rights of sovereignty and proprietary power.
It is quite possible to establish a tribal land tenure system based
on a leasehold tenure with an ultimate fee residing in the federal
government. It is neither mandatory nor necessary that tribal
tenurial systems be founded on a freehold tenure in order to be a
viable tenurial system. The advantages of a freehold tenure system
are that it provides the best form of security for credit and an il-
lusory sense of absolute ownership, which is in effect a powerful
incentive to develop the land. The freehold tenure system provides
opportunities for large profits, control of land, and symbolic
political freedom or social status. But there are obvious disad-
vantages to a freehold tenure system: the ability to purchase a
freehold may entail the exhaustion of capital resources in poor
communities or limit the ability to develop the land; the inability
to borrow money on freehold property has been a curse to poor
communities everywhere; and excessive fractioning of the land
also is a concern, especially in communities with an increasing
population and limited land. Another problem of freehold tenures
concerns the older members of the society and the infirm or
crippled members of society. Freehold tenures have always viewed
these people as obstacles in the path of progress and have attemp-
ted to displace them.
Under a leasehold tenure system, a tribe could, if it desired, en-
sure economical use of the lands within the reservations, be able to
take steps to meet new conditions, and could insist on measures
that would improve the tribal lands and natural resources. Ade-
quate security of tenure can be granted, especially under the man-
dates of the Indian Civil Rights Act. But it is hardly necessary to
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observe that many of the arguments against a freehold can be
equally valid against very lengthy leases. There is no doubt that
the tribes could create a land tenure system of their choice which
would meet the needs of the elders and the less fortunate in tribal
society.
In any event, under the classic paradigm of tribal title and domi-
nion, the tribes should have the right to formulate their own
system of land tenure based on their values and culture. In this
situation the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the Department of In-
terior should play an extremely limited role, if any, in the tribal
tenure system. This is not rhetoric nor scapegoating the Bureau,
but a matter of economic efficiency and self-determination. The
Bureau should allow the tribal governments the maximum latitude
in making their own decisions concerning the use of their proper-
ty. Trusteeship should yield to tribal self-determination.
The limited role of the Bureau is necessary because tribal reser-
vations of aboriginal title are the last remains of land which is not
under the federal land tenure until extinguished by voluntary ar-
rangements. Because it is outside the federal land tenure, the
power of the federal government should strictly be held to con-
stitutional standards, rather than the plenary power of Congress
over its territories. These distinctions are important to tribal
development, liberating the tribe from administrative restraints
and regulations.
It should always be remembered that the notion of trusteeship is
the result of rapid expansion of the governmental interpretation of
a very open-ended delegation of power to administrative agencies
by Congress in general legislation. The justification for trusteeship
is circular and a result of policy rather than principle. Trusteeship
is policy oriented. It is purposive in the sense that when the deci-
sion about how the administrative agencies determine how to
apply a statute to the "best interest" of the Indian people, the
decision-making process usually depends on factors that con-
tribute more to national goals than to tribal needs. The history of
the land policy is indicative of this instrumentalism in the ad-
ministrative agencies. But this is also the result of open-ended
delegation with vague standards resulting in an ad hoc balancing
of interests that resists reduction to general principles.
The tribes have been oppressed by this ad hoc balancing for at
least one hundred and fifty years. Now is their opportunity to
establish a land tenure system which may result in both economic
development and self-determination. Under the classic paradigm,
this result could occur; under the modern paradigm, it cannot.
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NOTES
1. Cf T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). A paradigm, for
our purposes, is a set of shared conceptions held by any academic or professional com-
munity concerning what is possible. It defines the boundaries of acceptable inquiry and the
limiting assumptions within a discipline: It is a set of implicit assumptions, concepts,
theories, and postulates held in common by several members of a community, which
enables them to explore jointly a well-defined and delimited area of inquiry and to com-
municate in a specialized language about the subject. In regard to law or jurisprudence, a
paradigm may be roughly described in like manner as the study of lawyers' fundamental
assumptions. Bentham spoke of it as "the art of being methodically ignorant of what
everybody knows." If "lawyer" is substituted for "everybody," the paradigms of
jurisprudence are established. Every lawyer, whether a practitioner or a legal scholar,
usually takes for granted the meanings of such statements as "that is a rule of law," "the
decision is binding on the Court of Appeals," and "X has a legal right to be paid by Y." All
these implicit assumptions are paradigms. The purpose of jurisprudence and legal scholar-
ship is to elucidate the statements of the juridical paradigms and to evaluate them. Another
important function of jurisprudence is to be alert to the inherent dangers of paradigms in
legal practice that create a certain conservatism and resistance to any input in order to gain
a certain measure of security in law, but at the cost of acting as a barrier to understanding
any other possibilities beyond its own particular set of working assumptions. It is the latter
issue that this article seeks to clarify and reform.
2. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). This case established the
modern paradigm of tribal title, which holds that Indian title is not a source of title under
American law. It has been characterized purely as a right of occupancy, subject to the
superior and ultimate title in fee of the sovereign. Occupancy is defined as a naked posses-
sion at the will of the sovereign under this paradigm, e.g., United States v. Gemmill, 535
F.2d. 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
3. The lack of descriptive or analytical principles of Indian title was first addressed in
1901. S. BLEDSOLE, INDIAN LAND LAW (1909). The attempts to reconcile Indian title with
federal title are primarily limited to the works of Felix H. Cohen. His first work in Indian
law was FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, (1942; rev., 1958). Also important is OriginalIndian Title, 32
MINN. L. REV. (1947). Other important modern notes which have influenced the develop-
ment of tribal title under the modern paradigm are The Indian Battle for
Self-Determination, 58 CAL. L. REV. 445 (1970) and Indian Title: The Rights of American
Natives in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 655
(1975). See also Smith, The Concept ofNative Title, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1974) This arti-
cle discusses Indian title from the Canadian perspective and determines that native title
arises from fundamental property principles common to nearly all property and legal
systems, but has no basis in international law or common law. Smith also asserts that the
confusion concerning native title arises from a failure to distinguish the native property in-
stitutions from other legal and nonlegal property institutions involving the same territory.
The author does not reach an understanding of land tenure theory.
4. Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
5. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973). This is a crucial article in the development of pro-
perty law in America. It illustrates the problem of adjusting the eighteenth-century con-
cepts of property inherited by the American legal profession to the social and economic
realities of the nineteenth-century American economy. In the process of change, land came
to be viewed almost exclusively as a productive asset. Ownership of property was justified
in the courts under an "instrumental" form of jurisprudence almost exclusively based on
land's contribution in increasing national wealth. A similar process occurred in the concep-
tualization of tribal property.
6. R. UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 52-54, 66-86 (1976).
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7. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923). "[Indian right of occupancy] had in
view the original nomadic tribal occupancy, but it is likewise true that in its essential spirit
it applies to individual Indian occupancy as well."
8. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 476, 477 (1970). See 25 U.S.C. 465, 483
(1970).
9. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L.93-638, 25 U.S.C.
450 (1970). See Barsh & Trosper, Title I of Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of1975," 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 361 (1975). This article illustrates the pro-
blems of federal delegations of self-determination to tribes in terms of the repetition of cer-
tain policy errors which could hinder tribal self-determination rather than promote it.
10. An Indian cannot sell his land or its interest to another if it belongs to the tribe. 9
Op. ATT'Y GEN. 24 (1857). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has determined that an in-
dividual Indian's interest in the tribal property is as perfect as that of any other person
within the boundaries of the tribal lands, but this is not the same form of interest as a tenan-
cy in common under American land tenure systems. Journeycake v. Cherokee Nation & the
United States, 155 U.S. 196 (1894). The Court has also stated that individual members of a
tribe are not entitled to share in the common property of the tribe due to the nature of the
relationship between the tribe and the federal government. Shoshone Tribe v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937). The opinion may have been modified by the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. 302. Under this Act the individual members of tribes must be
granted due process by the tribal government in regard to their possession of tribal proper-
ty.
11. See note 3 supra.
12. I. SUTTON. INDIAN LAND TENURE 1316, 23-34 (1975).
13. See cases cited at note 4, supra. See also United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S.
111, 115-17 (1938); BLEDSOLE supra note 3.
14. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
15. Id. at 279.




20. See note 2, supra.
21. J. SACKMAN. TITLES 1-6 (1958). Compare 1 L. DEMBITZ. LAND TITLES 65 (1895).
22. C. POWELL. REAL PROPETY 39 (1963). The contempt for history and its resulting bias
to the practicing lawyer is somewhat justified by the law school experience. Most property
classes present an unquestioned paradigm to law students that there is a unity of federal ti-
tle which precludes tribal title. This paradigm does not present to law students any
penetrating analysis or discussion of the manner in which this unity of title was acquired,
but leaves them with the belief that it was derived from Great Britain after the Revolu-
tionary War. This limited approach to legal history has created a situation whereby proper-
ty is seen as devoid of any moral and ethical principles, in the tradition of Langdellian case
analysis. B. ACKERMAN. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW vi-ix (1975). Acker-
man suggests that the trans-national acquisition of land from aboriginal peoples in com-
bination with economic theory will provide a framework that will overcome the absence of
moral principles in introductory property classes.
It is also suggested that the lack of attention to origins of the federal land tenure system
and its development has created a situation that is inherently biased against tribal land
tenure systems, and that this is currently reflected in the decisions of the courts, as well as in
the judgment of practicing attorneys. This bias is directly contrary to the spirit of a neutral
and general legal system, establishing a particular set of beliefs within the legal education
process contrary to the existing law. This omission of trans-national or intertenurial ac-
quisition of land and its legal implications in the traditional introductory property class
might appropriately be labeled as a manifestation of "cognitive imperialism" from a tribal
point of view.
23. Id.
24. For example, see 1 J. LOCKE. Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT §§ 27, 40, 45 (the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol5/iss1/3
origin of property is an extension of human personality and labor); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733-37 (1964).
25. For example, see J. BENTHAM. THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (Hildreth ed. 1864);
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
26. See notes 24-25, supra.
27. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1885). "The customs, beliefs, or needs or a
primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or
necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been
forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for.
Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reduce it with the pre-
sent state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have been
found for it, and it enters on a new career."
28. Id.
29. See Lowie, Land Tenure, 5 ENCY. OF Soc. Sci. 76 (1933); Biebuyck, Land Tenure,
8 INT'L ENCY. OF SOC. SCI. 562 (1968).
30. A. CASNER & W.LEACH, PROPERTY 247-51 (1969).
31. See note 25, supra.
32. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 74 (Rhys ed. 1914); LOCKE, supra note 24, § §27, 40, 45; THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS (A. Hamilton) (Rossiter ed.); C. MACPERSON THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF
PROGRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES To LOCKE (1962).
33. Id. See also Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolu-
tionary Era: The Ideal of VolitionalAllegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208 (1974).
34. This school is associated with Hobbes, supra note 32, and the tradition of legal
positivism from Bentham and Holmes through H.L.A. Hart.
35. This school is associated loosely with Locke and the traditions of natural law, and
the welfare economics of J.S. Mills and R.H. Coarse.
36. See notes 32, 34, 35, supra.
37. HARRIS, THE ORIGINS OF LAND TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 5-14 (1953).
38. FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 32.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 4.
40. L. HANKE, ARISTOTLEAND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1959).
41. Ashcraft, Hobbe's Natural Man: A Study of Ideology Formation, 33 J. OF POLITICS
1076 (1971); L. HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
(1949); Cohen, Spanish Origins of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEo.
L.J. 1, (1942).
42. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The tribal title issue in this case was but a small por-
tion of the opinion, but it was the ultimate conflict in the fact situation which the Court
avoided. For a more detailed description of the case, see, HAINES, THE ROLE OFTHE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAND POLITICS 1789-1835, at 314-28 (1944).
43. Id. at 142-43.
44. Id. at 147.
45. Id. at 121-23.
46. Id. at 121, citing 1 VATTEL, §§ 81, 209, 2, § 97; MONTESQUIEU. b.18, c.12; A. SMITH.
WEALTH OF NATIONS, b.5, c.1. Accord, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545-46.
(1832); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,588 (1823).
47. See HAINES, supra note 42, at 121.
48. Id. at 147.
49. Id. at 143.
50. Id. at 122. This issue also perplexed the Court. In oral arguments the Court asked
the attorneys for Mr. Peck whether the rights Georgia had before extinguishment of Indian
title were susceptible of conveyance or was the title in fee simple. Rather than answer this
question, the attorneys stressed conquest as extinguishing the Indian title. For elaboration
on conveyance arguments, see Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543,583-84 (1823).
51. HAINES. supra note 42.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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54. Id. at 146-47. The terminology of "limited sovereignty" did not suggest any con-
notation that tribes were a lower form of property than the federal government (which held
less power than the states at this time), nor that Congress had the right to control the Indian
nations. In legal theory, it was probably meant to convey the idea of the treaty agreements
to limit the market of tribal title and trade solely to the federal government.
55. Id. at 147.
56. Id.
57. Id. But see FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 3, at 592.
58. HAINES, supra note 42, at 146.
59. Id. at 147.
60. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, PROPERTY 247-51 (1969). A fee simple is absolute owner-
ship so far as our law knows it.
61. Id. at 1008. "Preemptive rights" in the sense used by Justice Johnson were a
restraint on alienation, rather than a right to acquire title by the United States as successor -
in-interest to Great Britain's interest. See 3 KENT, COMMENTARIES 385 (1848). Preemption
s.eems to be a derivative of the principle of discovery, but its relationship is uncertain as
discovery and preemption were used interchangeably in the classic paradigm. Accord,
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) (preemptive privilege). In in-
tertenurial conveyances, discovery is more proper to use than preemptive rights, but the
better descriptive concept is that of an "entitlement." See Calabesi & Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV
1089 (1972). Calabesi and Melamed hold that, "In our framework, much of what is general-
ly called private property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected by a property
rule. No one can take the entitlement of private property from the holder unless the holder
sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values the property." Id at 1105.
Therefore, "[wihenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor. Absent such
decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of 'might
makes right'-whoever is stronger or shrewder will win. Hence, the fundamental thing that
law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail .... Having
made its initial choice, society must enforce the choice ...."Id. at 1090. "These decisions
go to the manner in which entitlements are protected and to whether an individual is
allowed to sell or trade the entitlements." Id. at 1092.
62. See HAINES, supra note 42, at 147.
63. Id.
64. Id. There existed little doubt that the Indian tribes were in actual possession of the
land. President Washington forbade the first Yazoo sales by a vigorous and decisive stand
against it.
65. The controlling statute was passed by Congress in 1790 and is now embodied in 25
U.S.C. 177 (1970). Section 4 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790,
declared as national policy and law that "fn]o sale of lands made by and from Indians, or
any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or per-
sons, or to any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless
the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of
the United States." See F. PRUCHA. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 144-47
(1962).
66. This would the the position today of most tribal reservations carved out of their
aboriginal territory. If tribal lands were placed under a unitary theory of federal owner-
ship, the tribal land could be considered easily as a fee simple absolute with the federal
government holding preemptive interest or an entitlement.
67. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
68. See note 61, supra, on preemption.
69. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 60, at 550-59. The purchasers of the land under tribal
dominion claimed the land under a proper legal conveyance: a deed pool, duly executed
and delivered at the British military post at a public treaty council. Compare the discussion
in note 65 and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1832). This policy was
inaugrated by the Board of Trade after a recommendation to such effect at the Albany Con-
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ference in 1754. See, NAMMACK, FRAUD, POLITICS, AND DIspOssEsSION Or THE INDIANS
(1969). Accord, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 547 (1832).
70. Treaty of Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; Treaty of June 7, 1803, 7 Stat. 74. The treaties
were, presumably, part of the federal question of jurisdiction. The exact nature of the
federal patent was not discussed in the opinion or statement of facts. The parties also
alleged diversity of citizenship and a jurisdictional amount over $2,000. However, the
Court's grounds for federal jurisdiction of the case are not clear.
71. See HAINES, supra note 42, at 605. There are some problems with the decision.
First, it is contrary to the position of the British law of the Empire. A more important objec-
tion was that this doctrine is in conflict with the doctrine that titles derived from grants
made by a previous sovereign were not affected by the change of sovereignty of territory in
which the land was involved. This principle is well recognized in subsequent cases in the
Supreme Court and is fundamental to international law, which enjoins respect for and pro-
tection of preexisting private rights. Delassus v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 117 (1835);
United States v. Clark, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834); United States v. Arredoonds, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 691 (1832). Compare Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835) and
Choteau v. Molony, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203 (1853). See HAINES, at 594-604, for the strained
reasoning of the Court on this issue.
72. Id. at 593-94.
73. Id. at 572.
74. Id.
75. Id..
76. Id. See also note 120, infra (Mohegan Indians).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 572-93.
79. See note 61, supra. Accord, Mitchell v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,556 (1832).
80. The Court stated in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that "the ques-
tion of vacant lands within the United States become joint property, or belonged to the
separate states, was a momentous question which, at one time, threatened to shake the
American confederacy to its foundations. This important contest had been compromised
and the compromised is not now to be disturbed." But the fact situation of Fletcher and
M'Intosh are similar in respect to the Indians. It could be argued that the Court was indeed
compromising that compromise by placing the federal government as the exclusive owner
of the tribal lands.
81. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,572 (1823).
82. Id. at 573.
83. Id. See also note 61, supra.
84. Id. at 574.
85. Id. at 573.
86. Id. at 574. Compare with note 61, supra.
87. Id. at 573.
88. Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 573. See also supra note 55.
90. Id. at 574.
91. Id. at 487. Discovery also gave the Europeans only as much sovereignty as the
natives would allow them to exercise. In short, the authority of the Europeans was consen-
sual and not absolute over the natives under a discovery theory.
92. See text of note 96, infra. Compare FEDERAL INDIAN LAW. supra note 3, at 122-23,
with Original Indian Title, supra note 3. There is a change in Cohen's position from con-
quest to a purchase theory in relation to land acquisition.
93. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
94. Id. at 589.
95. Id. at 577-85.
96. Id. at 589-91. Conquest in the Roman and European legal and political theory was
the utilization of armed force to acquire and maintain territories, but it also required that
the conquering nation incorporate the conquered people into its society. However, the pro-
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perty rights of the conquered people remained unimpaired as conquest was not a property
theory. It was a political allegiance theory. Id. at 589. Faced with this situation, the Court
concluded that "resort to some new and different rule, better adapted to the actual state of
things, was unavoidable." Id. at 591. The new theory was that of discovery and purchase
of tribal lands. Accord, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545-46 (1832).
97. HAINES, supra note 42, at 591-92.
98. Id. at 592.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 593. Accord, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 547 (1832).
101. Id. at 593-94. Another commentator on transfers of Indian title has reached the
same conclusion, stating that "The 'sale' in the Indian's mind meant the admission of the
white man to a Sachem's rights with the area specified." Gookin, Indian Deeds on the
Vineyard, 13 BULL. MASS. ARCH. Soc. 7 (1952). See JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA
128-46 (1975); Washburn, The Historical Context of American Indian Legal Problems, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 12, 14-15(1976).
102. HAINES. supra note 42, at 594.
103. Id.
104. Dwight, Harrington and His Influence Upon American Political Institutions, 2
POL. ScI. Q. 1 (1887).
105. HARRINGTON (Blitzer ed. 1955). Harrington is important because of his notion of
the relationship of land distribution to the form of government which made the Founding
Fathers nervous about purchases from Indian tribes, as well made them aware of the need
for the federal government to regulate land use and the distributional preferences of land
purchased from the tribes. In other words, Harrington's theories haunted the concept of
democracy with the warning that individual ownership would continue democracy, large
landed estates could create aristocracy, etc.
106. 2 LOCKE. supra note 24, at §§ 3, 27.
107. Id. at §§ 124,-127, 134, 138. Compare with §§ 24-25, 94.
108. Id. at §§ 140, 142, 149, 172.
109. Id.
110. 1 Paine 457, 13 Cas. (1825) (No. 7143).
111. It should be stressed that M'Intosh was the only opinion of the classic paradigm
in the Marshall Court that was unanimous.
112. 1 Op. ATT-Y GEN. 465 (1821).
113. Id. at 465.
114. J. SMITH, APPEALS To THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 418
(1950).
115. 126-27 (1743) (Houghton Library, Harvard University). See SMITH, supra note
114, at 422-42.
116. SMITH, supra note 114, at 425 (Indian lands not intended to pass to colony in
charter).
117. Id. at 426.
118. Id. at 427-28.
11. Id. at 429-32.
120. Id. at 433.
121. Id. at 434. In M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that Mohegan Indians did not stand for the "assertion of the principle
that an individual might obtain a complete and valid title from the tribes." This was an er-
ror. Mohegan Indians did assert that principle and the Privy Council did affirm. Id. at 598.
The Court in M'Intosh was faced with a profound dilemma in denying the power of the in-
dividual to purchase from tribes. It could have merely asserted this as a matter of federal
law, but it attempted to discuss the British trinity by fallacious arguments in distinguishing
the facts of the plaintiff's argument. See note 71, supra.
122. SMITH. supra note 114, at 441-42 (Jan. 15, 1773).
123. CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON THE COLONIES, 204. Like Mohegan
Indians, this opinion was also rejected in M'Intosh. The Court asserted the fallacious argu-
ment that this opinion referred to the East Indians, not American Indians, on the grounds
that the opinion commences with the words "princes and government." "We speak of their
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sachems, their warriors, their chief man, their nation, or tribes, not of their 'princes and
government,"' Marshall stated. This argument is absurd. The leading figure in one New
England war was Prince Philip, and it was named the Prince Philip War. I. MATHER,, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR WITH THE INDIANS IN NEW ENGLAND (1676).
124. Id. Compare Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
599-600 (1823).
125. See Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. M. EGLESTON, THE LAND SYSTEM OFTHE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES 7-10 (1886).
129. W. MACLEOD, THE AMERICAN INDIAN FRONTIER 197-200 (1928). As early as 1629,
two successive letters instructed Governor Endicott of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to
pay particular attention to quieting Indians' claims to lands.
130. 1 ANDROS, THE ANDROS TRACTS 50-51 (1868-74).
131. Id. at 51.
132. Eisinger, Puritan Justification for the Taking of Indian Land, ESSEX INSTITUTE
HIST. COLL. 131, 141 (1948).
133. Locke's theory regarding labor and vacant land was never applied by the Court.
It applied to man as a species, not to man in society. This theory was at the heart of the
arguments of Winthrop's vacant land and Biblical tests. In Mntosh, the Court avoided the
argument (21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823)), but in Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553
(1832), the Court entered into the controversy and stated, "To the United States, it could be
a matter of no concern, whether [the Indian tribe's] whole territory was devoted to hunting
grounds, or whether an occasional village, and an occasional cornfield, interrupted, and
gave some variety to the scene." The use "could not, however, be supposed than any inten-
tion existed of restricting the full use of land they reserved" in a treaty.
134. JENNINGS, supra note 101.
135. Eisinger, supra note 132, at 138.
136. Id.
137. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 560-605. (1823). See also notes 121,123.
138. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,17 (1831).
139. In part, the confusion surrounding wardship is a problem of legal theory. The
land tenure system of the United States is founded on a problematic foundation: the in-
tersection of Roman law and English common law. The Roman law supplies a small part of
the modern law of property, but practically all of the modern theory of property, while the
English common law supplies the greatest part of the law, but very little theory. An exam-
ple of the Roman law influence is seen in the works of Bentham and especially in the works
of Austin, while Blackstone is an example of the source of English law. The convergence of
the folk concepts of English law with the more theoretical Roman law created the totality of
American property law.
140. NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY 80-82 (19-).
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id. at 81.
143. Chouteau v. Molony, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203,237 (1853).
144. NOYES, supra note 140, at 96; HARRIS, supra note 37, at 42.
145. Id.
146. NOYES, supra note 140, at 60.
147. Id. at 410.
148. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
149. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552 (1832).
150. Id. In terms of a later provision in the treaty to the effect that the United States in
Congress shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with Indians, and
manage all their affairs, as it thinks proper, the Court held that would be "ft]o construe the
expression of their necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction which has
been uniformly put on them." With regard to the theory that the section grants the right to
regulate all the trade affairs of the tribes, the Court stated, "[This theory] cannot be true as
respecting the management of all their affairs. The most important of these are cession of
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their lands, and security against intruders on them. Is it credible, that they should have con-
sidered themselves as giving to the United States the right to dictate their future cessions,
and the terms on which they should be made? or to compel their submission to the violence
of disorderly and licentious intruders? It is equally inconceivable that they could have
supposed themselves, by a phrase thus slipped into an article, on another and most in-
teresting subject, to have divested themselves of the right of self-government on subjects
not connected with trade .... Had such a result been intended, it would have been openly
avowed." Id. at 545. The same result was reached in interpreting a later treaty with the
tribe. Id. at 555-56.
151. Id. at 559. The Court also stated that the "[viarious acts of IGeorgia's]
legislature.., prove her acquiescence in the universal conviction that the Indian nations
possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by
the United States, with their consent." Id. at 560. Also, it should be noted that the laws the
state of Georgia attempted to extend over tribal lands were labeled "extraterritorial" by the
Court, signifying a distinction. As M'Intosh created and held tribal dominion as distinct
from federal title, this case distinguishes it from the tenures of the states.
152. Id. at 559.
153. Id. at 556, 560-61.
154. The Court did not cite to any governmental policy, although it alleged that both
international law and governmental policy would control. Instead, it relied solely on legal
decision and treaties in making its decision. See Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,587, 591 (1823).
155. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 -61 (1832), and cases cited at
note 71, supra. See also Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 244 (1872) (Indian title of occupancy
absolute, subject only to the right of purchase). Accord, United States v. Shoshone Tribe,
304 U.S. 111, 116 (1937); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 225 (1922); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389 (1901); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899); Leavenworth v.
United States, 92 U.S. 733, 743 (1877).
156. The limitation of alienation was not inherent in the nature of tribal title, but
rather was imposed by discovery through statutes or acts. In M'Intosh three statutes were
involved: the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Virginia statute prohibiting individual pur-
chase (at 585), and the Non-Intercourse Act. These statutes reflected the distributional
preference of the entitlement granted by the principle of discovery, which was valid to all
the subjects or citizens under the control of the discovering nation or its successor-in-
interest. These statutory limitations on the right to purchase Indian title illustrate the
transferability of tribal title. It was the transferability of tribal title that created the need for
limitation on the right to purchase by the legitimate sovereign on its citizens. Clark v.
Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195 (1839) (Indian right of Occupancy protected by the political
power, and respected by the Court). Accord, United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591
(1873). See also HAINES. supra note 42, at 147.
157. In cases that follow the classic paradigm, there is a rather formalistic manner
with little understanding of the theories of the Marshall Court, in particular the genius of
Chief Justice Marshall. See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 3, and Original Indian Title,
supra note 3.
158. See note 3, supra.
159. Id.
160. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 3, at 292 (Indian tribes did not enjoy and could
not convey complete title to the soil).
161. Id.; OriginalIndian Title, supra note 3, at 47.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See generally G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL (1932); BLEDSOLE. supra note 3, at 1-
5; W. SEMPLE. OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND TITLE 3-17 (1952).
165. See ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 288, as amended 25 U.S.C. 331 (1970). See also
BLEDSOLE, supra note 3, at 220-37; SEMPLE, supra note 164, at 18-39, 512-77.
166. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. a (the Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulation respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any
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claims of the United States or of any particular State). Congress' power to control land
under federal tenure is derived from this paragraph. It is also considered the source to
which the federal courts have traced the power of the United States to govern territories,
although this power has also been ascribed to the inherent sovereignty of the federal
government. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 27
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828). But it is through the treaty-making power that the United
States can acquire territory. U.S. CONST.. art. VI, § 2.
In the situation of removed tribes and tribes within territory purchased by the United
States from indigenous tribes, this power was transferred into a theory of plenary power.
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (the power existing in Congress to ad-
minister upon and guard the tribal property, and the power being political and ad-
ministrative in its nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the
legislative branch to determine and is not one for the courts); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903) (plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised
by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deeded a political one, not
subject to control by the judicial department of the government). Both of these cases arise
in Indian Territory, and confuse wardship with ownership of the involved land. In the in-
stance of tribal territory that is aboriginal or a reservation of tribal aboriginal land for a
tribe, the property is not under control of Congress nor does it belong to the United States
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